College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview

Conferences, Events, and Lectures

2018

Section 4: Criminal Law
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School

Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 4: Criminal Law" (2018). Supreme Court Preview. 280.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/280

Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview

IV. Criminal Law
IN THIS SECTION:
New Case: Madison v. Alabama ................................................................................................ 180
“TOO OLD TO BE EXECUTED? SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS AN AGING DEATH ROW”
Adam Liptak ............................................................................................................................ 181
“SUPREME COURT STAYS EXECUTION OF INMATE WHO LAWYERS SAY IS NOT COMPETENT”
Steve Almasy and Mayra Cuevas............................................................................................ 184
“THE CRUELTY OF EXECUTING THE SICK AND ELDERLY: TWO CONTROVERSIAL CASES IN
ALABAMA REVEAL A DISTURBING TREND IN THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA.”
Matt Ford ................................................................................................................................ 186
“EXECUTION CALLED OFF FOR ALABAMA INMATE VERNON MADISON”
Ivana Hrynkiw ......................................................................................................................... 189
New Case: Bucklew v. Precythe ................................................................................................. 193
“SUPREME COURT TO HEAR CASES ON DEATH PENALTY AND CLASS ACTIONS”
Adam Liptak ............................................................................................................................ 210
“DEATH-ROW INMATE WITH RARE DISEASE GETS U.S. SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Greg Stohr ............................................................................................................................... 211
“MISSOURI APPEAL COULD DELAY MISSISSIPPI DEATH PENALTY CASE”
Jeff Amy .................................................................................................................................. 212
New Case: Gamble v. United States........................................................................................... 214
“SUPREME COURT AGREES TO TAKE UP DOUBLE JEOPARDY ISSUE”
Pete Williams .......................................................................................................................... 216
“UPCOMING SCOTUS CASE COULD COMPLICATE NY EFFORT TO CLOSE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
‘LOOPHOLE’”
Colby Hamilton and Dan M. Clark ......................................................................................... 218
“DON’T GAMBLE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY”
Ilya Shapiro ............................................................................................................................. 222
“SUPREME COURT TO HEAR DOUBLE JEOPARDY CASE WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR MUELLER”
Randall Eliason ....................................................................................................................... 224

178

New Case: Garza v. Idaho ......................................................................................................... 229
“CLIENTS, LAWYERS, AND APPEALS”
Kent Scheidegger .................................................................................................................... 237
“JUSTICE TO RESOLVE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER APPEAL WAIVERS”
Dan McCue ............................................................................................................................. 238

179

Madison v. Alabama
Ruling Below: Madison v. Alabama, CC-1985-001385.80 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 2018)
Overview: Madison has been on death row for 30 years and has suffered several serious strokes
resulting in dementia. Madison’s dementia rendered him unable to remember committing the crime
for which he is to be executed.
Issue: : 1. Whether, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, as the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman, a state may execute a prisoner whose mental
disability leaves him with no memory of his commission of the capital offense; and 2. Whether
evolving standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment bar the execution of a prisoner whose competency has been compromised by vascular
dementia and multiple strokes causing severe cognitive dysfunction and a degenerative medical
condition that prevents him from remembering the crime for which he was convicted or
understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution.
State of Alabama, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Madison Vernon, Defendants-Appellants
Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama
Decided on January 16, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Robert H, Smith, Circuit Judge:
ORDER
This Court held a hearing on January
16, 2018 on Defendant’s petition to suspend
his execution because he claims he is
incompetent to be executed pursuant to
Alabama Code § 15-16-23. The Defendant
was present and represented by counsel.
Counsel from the Office of the Attorney
General were also present for the State of
Alabama. This Court received argument on
the issue.

The Defendant did not provide a
substantial threshold showing of insanity, a
requirement set out by the United States
Supreme Court,
sufficient to convince this Court to stay the
execution. As a result, this Court hereby
DENIES Defendant’s petition to stay the
execution. And the State’s motion to dismiss
the petition to suspend the execution is
hereby GRANTED.
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“Too Old to Be Executed? Supreme Court Considers an Aging Death Row”

The New York Times
Adam Liptak

March 5, 2018
The nation’s death rows are starting to look
like geriatric wards. Condemned inmates in
many states are more likely to die of natural
causes than to be executed. The rare ones
who are put to death often first spend decades
behind bars, waiting.
It turns out that executing old men is not easy.
In November, Ohio called off an attempt to
execute Alva Campbell, 69, after the
execution team could not find a suitable vein
into which to pump lethal chemicals. The
state announced that it would try again in
June 2019, by which time he would have
been 71.
But Mr. Campbell suffered from what one
judge called an “extraordinary list of
ailments.” He used a walker, could barely
breathe and relied on a colostomy bag. He
was found lifeless in his cell on Saturday,
having died in the usual way, without
government assistance.
In Alabama last month, state officials called
off the execution of Doyle Lee Hamm, 61,
also because they could not find a suitable
vein. Mr. Hamm has at least two kinds of
cancer, cranial and lymphatic, and he may not
have long to live with or without the state’s
efforts.

Last week, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case of another Alabama inmate,
Vernon Madison, 67, who suffers from
dementia and cannot remember the crime that
sent him to death row. The court, which has
barred
the
execution
of juvenile
offenders and the intellectually disabled, is
now turning its attention to old people.
In 1985, Mr. Madison killed a police officer,
Julius Schulte, who had been trying to keep
the peace between Mr. Madison and his exgirlfriend, Cheryl Greene, as she sought to
eject him from what had been their shared
home. Mr. Madison shot Ms. Greene, too,
wounding her.
Mr. Madison remembers none of this. He has
suffered at least two severe strokes, and he is
blind and incontinent. His speech is slurred,
and what he says does not always make
sense.
He has asked that his mother be told of his
strokes, but his mother is dead. He soils
himself, saying “no one will let me out to use
the bathroom,” though there is a toilet in his
cell. He says he plans to move to Florida. He
can recite the alphabet, but only to the letter
G.
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Mr. Madison also insists that he “never went
around killing folks.”
A court-appointed psychologist found that
Mr. Madison had “significant body and
cognitive decline as a result of strokes.” But
the psychologist testified that Mr. Madison
understood what he was accused of and how
the state planned to punish him. According to
Steve Marshall, Alabama’s attorney general,
that is enough.
The Supreme Court’s precedents bar the
execution of people who lack a “rational
understanding” of the reason they are to be
put to death.
Mr. Marshall told the justices that Mr.
Madison satisfied that standard. “The ability
to form a rational understanding of an event,”
he wrote in January in a brief urging the
justices to stay out of the case, “has very
limited relation to whether a person
remembers that event.”
Mr. Madison’s case, which has been
bouncing around the court system for more
than 30 years, has taken some unusual turns.
His first conviction was reversed because
prosecutors violated the Constitution by
excluding all seven potential jurors who were
black. His second conviction was thrown
out after prosecutors committed misconduct
by using expert testimony to tell the jury
about evidence never properly introduced.
At Mr. Madison’s third trial, the jury voted to
sentence him to life in prison. But Judge
Ferrill D. McRae, of Mobile County Circuit
Court, overrode that verdict and sentenced
Mr. Madison to death.

I interviewed Judge McRae in 2011, not long
before he died. I had sought him out because
he had achieved a rare distinction. He had
overridden six jury verdicts calling for life
sentences, a state record, while never
rejecting a jury’s recommendation of death.
Alabama juries are not notably squeamish
about the death penalty, but Judge McRae
said they needed to be corrected when they
were seized by an impulse toward mercy. “If
you didn’t have something like that,” he said
of judicial overrides, “a jury with no
experience in other cases would be making
the ultimate decision, based on nothing.”
Alabama abolished judicial overrides last
year.
In 2016, Mr. Madison came very close to
being put to death. A deadlocked eightmember Supreme Court refused to vacate a
stay of execution issued by a federal appeals
court, with the court’s four conservative
members saying they would have let the
execution proceed. Justice Antonin Scalia
had died a few months before, leaving the
Supreme Court short-handed. Had Justice
Scalia lived, Mr. Madison would almost
certainly be dead by now.
The case took some additional procedural
twists, and Mr. Madison returned to the
Supreme Court in January after a state court
again ruled against him. The Supreme
Court stayed his execution, though the
court’s three most conservative members —
Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito
Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch — said they would
have let it go forward.
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The case, Madison v. Alabama, No. 17-7505,
will be argued in the fall, and it will give the
court a chance to consider some profound
questions.
“Mr. Madison is one among a growing
number of aging prisoners who remain on

death row in this country for ever longer
periods of time,” Justice Stephen G. Breyer
wrote in a concurring opinion when the court
considered an earlier appeal. “Given this
trend, we may face ever more instances of
state efforts to execute prisoners suffering the
diseases and infirmities of old age.”
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“Supreme Court Stays Execution of Inmate Who Lawyers Say is Not Competent”

CNN
Steve Almasy and Mayra Cuevas

January 26, 2018
The US Supreme Court has granted a stay of
execution for an Alabama inmate whose
dementia, his lawyers say, prevents him from
remembering the murder he was convicted of
committing decades ago.
Alabama had planned to put Vernon
Madison, 67, to death on Thursday night, but
less than a half hour before the execution was
to take place, Justice Clarence Thomas issued
a temporary stay.
About two and a half hours later, the high
court announced that a stay had been granted
while the court decides what to do with an
appeal from the defense.
Madison has been convicted three times in
the shooting of Mobile police Cpl. Julius
Schulte, who was responding to a April 1985
domestic disturbance call. Madison, who was
on parole, sneaked up behind Schulte and
shot him twice in the head, according to court
documents. He also shot his girlfriend, who
survived her wounds.
At his first and second trials, Madison argued
that he was not guilty because he was
mentally ill. At his third trial, he argued selfdefense.

His attorneys from the Equal Justice
Initiative, based in Montgomery, filed a
petition Wednesday with the Supreme Court.
Madison's sentence was imposed in 1994 by
a judge, after a jury recommended life
without parole. His lawyers argue the death
sentence is unfair because a 2017 Alabama
law no longer permits judicial override and
they say Madison's sentence should be
commuted to life without parole.
"Given Alabama's rejection of judicial
override, the death sentence in this case
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and
violates Mr. Madison's rights to a jury, fair
and reliable sentencing and to due process
and equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Alabama law," they wrote
in their petition.
In prior appeals, Madison's attorneys have
argued their client doesn't fully understand
why he is being punished because dementia
has taken his ability to remember his crime.
They also say his health is declining.
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In November, the US Supreme Court agreed
with a state court ruling that Madison was
mentally competent.
"The state court did not unreasonably apply
(two prior decisions) when it determined that
Madison is competent to be executed because
-- notwithstanding his memory loss -- he
recognizes that he will be put to death as
punishment for the murder he was found to
have committed," the justices wrote.
Madison's lawyers asked Gov. Kay Ivey for
clemency.
"Mr. Madison suffers from vascular dementia
as a result of multiple serious strokes in the
last several years, and no longer has a
memory of the commission of the crime for
which he is to be executed," attorneys wrote.

"He does not understand why the state of
Alabama is attempting to execute him," they
said.
They argue that executing someone with
dementia is counter to how society treats
vulnerable citizens.
CNN reached out to the governor's office and
the state's Attorney General's office but didn't
get a response.
There are 182 inmates on Alabama's death
row, three of whom have been there longer
than Madison.
Before his execution was stayed, Madison
had two oranges for his last meal and did not
made any statements, officials said.
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“The Cruelty of Executing the Sick and Elderly: Two controversial cases in
Alabama reveal a disturbing trend in the death penalty in America.”

The New Republic
Matt Ford

February 27, 2018
Vernon Madison doesn’t know why he’s
going to be executed.
The state of Alabama tells him that he fatally
shot a police officer in the back and wounded
his ex-girlfriend during a domestic dispute in
1985. State courts tossed out his first two
convictions in the 1980s before a jury found
him guilty for the third time in 1994. Those
jurors, who were told of Vernon’s history of
mental illness, sentenced him to life
imprisonment without parole. The presiding
judge then used an esoteric provision of
Alabama law to sentence Madison to death
instead.
Now 67 years old, the longtime death-row
inmate is hardly the same man who was
convicted of capital murder almost a quartercentury ago. Multiple strokes have left him
with vascular dementia, a severe and
degenerative neurological disease that has
stripped Madison of his mental functions. He
can no longer see, walk independently, or
control his bladder. According to his petition
for review, a psychologist’s examination
found that he can no longer remember the
alphabet past the letter G or name the previous
president of the United States.

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to take
Madison’s case on Monday. But he isn’t the
only ailing death-row prisoner that Alabama
wants to execute. Last week, the state tried to
carry out its death warrant against Doyle
Hamm, a 61-year-old inmate suffering from
terminal lymphoma. Hamm’s lawyer Bernard
Harcourt warned ahead of time that his
client’s illness, chemotherapy regimen, and
past history of drug use would make it
impossible for prison personnel to find a
suitable vein for a lethal injection. A
misapplied injection can have horrific
consequences,
as
shown
by
Oklahoma’s botched execution of Clayton
Lockett in 2014.
On the night of his execution last week, the
prediction came true. Alabama executioners
struggled to find a workable vein for two and
a half hours as they punctured him multiple
times across his arms, legs, and groin. “The IV
personnel almost certainly punctured Doyle’s
bladder, because he was urinating blood for
the next day,” Harcourt told NBC News.
“They may have hit his femoral artery as well,
because suddenly there was a lot of blood
gushing out. There were multiple puncture
wounds on the ankles, calf, and right groin
area, around a dozen.” The team eventually
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gave up, as the execution warrant expired at
midnight.

sentenced him to life imprisonment without
parole.

Both men are symptomatic of America’s
aging death rows. In 2013, the latest year with
available data, the federal Bureau of Justice
Statistics found that death-row inmates waited
an average of 15 and a half years between
conviction and execution. In states that rarely
perform executions, the sentence is effectively
life imprisonment with a chance of death. The
problem isn’t limited to death row, either:
Thanks to mandatory minimums and decadeslong sentences, the number of American
inmates over age 55 jumped fourfold between
1990 and 2010.

That would have been the end of the legal saga
in most of the country, at least where the death
penalty is concerned. But Alabama was one of
a handful of states that allowed judicial
overrides in capital cases. (The state abolished
the practice in 2017, as the Supreme Court’s
intervention appeared imminent, but didn’t
apply it retroactively.) Madison’s third trial
judge was Ferrill McRae, who campaigned for
his elected post on a tough-on-crime platform
and often assigned himself the county’s
capital murder cases. McRae overrode the
jury and sent Madison to death row.

The procedural history of Madison’s case
reads like a travelogue through the death
penalty’s most persistent flaws. The state
court of criminal appeals vacated his first
conviction for the murder in 1986 after
learning that county prosecutors had struck all
seven black potential jurors before the trial.
(Madison is also black.) A second trial in 1990
also resulted in his conviction, only to be
tossed out again by the appeals court because
one of the prosecution’s expert witnesses went
beyond the factual record.

The Supreme Court has long interpreted the
Eighth Amendment to forbid executions of
those who cannot comprehend the
punishment. In 1986, the justices banned
executions of prisoners “who have lost their
sanity”
in Ford v. Wainwright,
citing
precedents as far back as Hanoverian England
that described the practice as “savage and
inhuman.” The court later ruled in the 2002
case Atkins v. Virginia that states could also
no longer execute people with intellectual
disabilities. In 2007, the justices expanded the
prohibition
in Panetti v. Quarterman to
require lower courts to consider whether an
inmate’s mental illness left him unable to
understand why they were being executed.

At his third trial, in 1994, Madison’s lawyers
highlighted his history of mental illness. A
psychologist testified for the defense that
Madison’s symptoms took the form of
paranoid delusions, which may have lessened
his culpability when he shot and killed the
police officer in 1985. After weighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
jurors found him guilty of murder and

“The potential for a prisoner’s recognition of
the severity of the offense and the objective of
community vindication are called in
question,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote
for the Panetti majority, “if the prisoner’s
mental state is so distorted by a mental illness
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that his awareness of the crime and
punishment has little or no relation to the
understanding of those concepts shared by the
community as a whole.”
Madison’s lawyers drew a direct line between
those rulings and their client’s plight.
“Since Ford and Panetti,
scientific
and
medical advancements have led to a greater
understanding of how neurocognitive
disorders manifest in individuals who suffer
from cognitive decline due to formerly
undefined reasons,” he argued in their petition
to the court. “Vernon Madison is one of these
individuals.”

In most places across the United States, the
death penalty is dying out. Fewer
jurisdictions
are
pursuing
capital
cases because of the extraordinary costs and
risk of wrongful convictions. More states
are stepping back from capital punishment by
simply not performing executions or
by abolishing it altogether. But it is not yet
dead. Until then, those who remain to face the
executioner’s needle increasingly seem to be
not the worst of the worst, but rather the sick
and dying, the aged and infirm, the
impoverished and the incompetent.
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“Execution called off for Alabama inmate Vernon Madison”

AL.com
Ivana Hrynkiw

January 26, 2018
Vernon Madison, one of the longest serving
inmates on Alabama's Death Row, was
scheduled to be executed at 6 p.m.
Thursday, but 30 minutes before the
scheduled execution the U.S. Supreme
Court issued a temporary stay. The stay was
later granted, and Madison's execution
called off.
Madison, 67, has been on death row for over
30 years after being convicted in April 1985
of killing Mobile police Cpl. Julius
Schulte. He was set to die by lethal injection
at Holman Correctional Facility in Atmore
Thursday night, but escaped execution for
the second time via an U.S. Supreme Court
order issuing a stay.
Attorney General Steve Marshall issued a
statement Friday morning in response to the
U.S. Supreme Court's issuance of the stay.
"After prior rulings that Vernon Madison is
competent to face execution for the murder
of a Mobile police officer 32 years ago - a
cold blooded crime for which there is no
doubt he is guilty - it is disappointing that
justice is again delayed for the victim's
family," Marshall said. "The State opposes
Madison's delay tactics and will continue to
pursue the execution of his death sentence."

The U.S. Supreme Court about 30 minutes
prior to the execution issued a temporary
stay, then was extended at 8:10 p.m.,
causing the execution to be called off for
Thursday night.
The Supreme Court's order states the stay is
in place until the justices decide whether
they will grant Madison's writ of certiorari request for a review of the case. Justices
Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil
Gorsuch would deny the application for
stay, the order said.
If a majority on the U.S. Supreme Court
refuses to review the case, then the stay will
automatically be lifted and the Attorney
General can then request a new execution
date for Madison from the state supreme
court.
In the certiorari request by Madison's
attorneys at the Equal Justice Initiative
(EJI), they say Madison is not competent to
be executed.
The EJI asks that the U.S. Supreme Court to
stay his execution and grant his petition for
certiorari. The court should address the
"substantial question of whether executing
Mr. Madison, whose severe cognitive
dysfunction leaves him without memory of
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his commission of the capital offense or
ability to understand the circumstances of
his scheduled execution, violates evolving
standards of decency and the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment."
"It is undisputed that Mr. Madison suffers
from
vascular
dementia
as
a
result of multiple serious strokes in the last
two years and no longer has a
memory of the commission of the crime for
which he is to be executed," according to the
EJI request. "His mind and body are failing:
he suffers from encephalomacia (dead brain
tissue), small vessel ischemia, speaks in a
dysarthric or slurred manner, is legally
blind, can no longer walk independently,
and has urinary incontinence as a
consequence of damage to his brain."
Madison was 34 when he was charged
Schulte's death, who was responding to a
domestic disturbance call. Madison also
was charged with shooting the woman he
lived with at the time, 37-year-old Cheryl
Ann Greene. She survived her injuries.
According to court records filed by
the Alabama Attorney General, here's a
police account of what happened that night:
Madison's neighbor's had called police, and
Schulte was assigned to protect Greene and
her 11-year-old daughter as Madison moved
out of their house. After pretending to leave
the property, Madison retrieved a pistol,
crept behind the police car Schulte was
sitting in, and fired two shots into the back
of the officer's head. After shooting Schulte,
Madison then shot Greene as she tried to
flee. There were three eye witnesses.

Madison's first trial took place in September
1985. He was convicted, but a state
appellate court sent the case back for a
violation involving race-based jury
selection.
His second trial took place in 1990.
Prosecutors presented a similar case, and
defense attorneys again argued that
Madison suffered from a mental illness.
They did not dispute the fact that Madison
shot Schulte, but said he did not know that
Schulte - dressed in plain clothes and
driving an unmarked police cruiser - was a
police officer.
He was again convicted, and a jury
recommended a death sentence by a 10-2
vote. An appellate court again sent the case
back to Mobile County for a retrial, this
time based on improper testimony from an
expert witness for the prosecution.
His third and final trial took place in April
1994. He was convicted, and the jury
recommended a life sentence after both
Madison and his mother, Aldonia
McMillan, asked for mercy. Mobile County
Circuit Judge Ferrill McRae sentenced
Madison to death-- this time overriding the
jury's recommendation.
In April 2017, Gov. Kay Ivey signed into
law a bill that says juries, not judges, have
the final say on whether to impose the death
penalty.
That
law officially
ended
Alabama's judicial override policy, as
Alabama was the last state to allow it.
Late Wednesday, Madison's attorneys filed
two more petitions to the U.S. Supreme
Court-- an application for a stay of
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execution, and a petition for a writ of
certiorari focused on the issue of judicial
override. Madison's attorneys argued that
since he was sent to death under the judicial
override statue, he is entitled to a stay and a
review of his case. Attorneys filed similar
motions to the Alabama Supreme Court, but
they denied the request earlier Wednesday.
"Because a death sentence is no longer
permissible in cases where the jury has
returned a sentence of life, Mr. Madison
filed a challenge to his death sentence and
scheduled execution in the Alabama
Supreme Court. He contended that this
execution would be arbitrary and capricious
and constitute a violation of the Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment," the
petition states. "The judicial override in this
case resulted in a death sentence that is
arbitrary,
disproportionate,
and
unconstitutional..."
The Alabama Attorney General's Office,
which opposes a delay, said in a Thursday
response that Madison's attorneys waited
too late to file their appeal based on the
judicial
override
issue.
"Madison's
inequitable conduct in delaying the filing of
his most recent legal claim until the day
before his scheduled execution should be
sufficient to warrant denial of the requested
stay of execution," the attorney general's
office stated in its brief to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Madison was first scheduled to be executed
by lethal injection in May 2016, but there
was a temporary delay. Hours after that
execution's scheduled time, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued a ruling upholding an

11th Circuit Court of Appeals stay of
execution. The AG's Office filed responses
in opposition to those petitions.
In November 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously reversed that decision, paving
the way for Madison to be executed.
Last month, Madison's attorneys from the
Equal Justice Initiative filed a petition in
Mobile County court to stay Madison's
execution, but after a hearing the judge in
that case denied the request for a stay of
execution. Bryan Stevenson, founder of the
EJI and one of Madison's attorneys, then
filed two new petitions to the U.S. Supreme
Court: One for a stay of execution, and one
asking the court to review the case. The
AG's Office also filed responses to those
requests.
Alabama Department of Corrections
spokesperson Bob Horton said Madison was
visited yesterday by his sister, two friends,
two attorneys, and a minister. Today, he was
visited by his brother, attorney, and a
minister.
Horton said in the past day, Madison has
made phone calls to several attorneys, his
daughter-in-law, several friends, and his
spiritual advisor. His last phone call was at
8:25 p.m. yesterday to his daughter-in-law.
Thursday morning, Madison had breakfast
of orange juice, eggs, two biscuits, jelly,
grits, and prunes. His last meal was two
oranges. He had no other special requests.
No family from either the victim's family or
Madison's family were to witness the
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execution. One of Madison's attorneys was
to be present.
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Bucklew v. Precythe
Ruling Below: Bucklew v. Precythe, 885 F.3d 527 (8th Cir. 2018)
Overview: Bucklew was convicted of murder, kidnapping, and rape. Bucklew is set to be
executed, but he has a medical condition that would be exacerbated by lethal injection making his
death extremely painful.
Issue: (1) Whether a court evaluating an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution
based on an inmate’s rare and severe medical condition should assume that medical personnel are
competent to manage his condition and that procedure will go as intended; (2) whether evidence
comparing a state’s method of execution with an alternative proposed by an inmate must be offered
via a single witness, or whether a court at summary judgment must look to the record as a whole
to determine whether a factfinder could conclude that the two methods significantly differ in the
risks they pose to the inmate; (3) whether the Eighth Amendment requires an inmate to prove an
adequate alternative method of execution when raising an as-applied challenge to the state’s
proposed method of execution based on his rare and severe medical condition; and (4) whether
petitioner Russell Bucklew met his burden under Glossip v. Gross to prove what procedures would
be used to administer his proposed alternative method of execution, the severity and duration of
pain likely to be produced, and how they compare to the state’s method of execution.
Russell Bucklew Appellant
v.
Anne L. Precythe, Director of the Department of Corrections, et al. Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Decided on March 15, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
ORDER
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN,
LOKEN,
COLLOTON,
GRUENDER,
SHEPHERD,
KELLY,
ERICKSON,
GRASZ and STRAS, Circuit Judges
Appellant Bucklew’s petition for
rehearing by panel is denied. Judge Colloton
would grant the petition for rehearing by
panel.

Appellant Bucklew’s petition for
rehearing en banc has been considered by the
court and the petition is denied. Chief Judge
Smith and Judge Kelly would grant the
petition. Judge Colloton and Judge Gruender
would grant rehearing en banc on Point I of
the petition for rehearing en banc.

Judge Duane Benton took no part in
the consideration or decision of the petition
for rehearing en banc.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.
I would grant Russell Bucklew’s
petition for rehearing en banc—and reverse
the district court’s grant of summary
judgment—for the reasons stated in the
dissent from the panel opinion in this case.
See Bucklew v. Precythe, ___ F.3d ___, 2018
WL 1163360, at *7 (8th Cir. 2018) (Colloton,
J., dissenting). I would also grant Bucklew’s
petition to the extent it seeks reconsideration
of this court’s conclusion, in Bucklew v.
Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1128 (8th Cir.
2015) (en banc), that those sentenced to death
must plead a “feasible, readily implemented
alternative procedure” for carrying out their
sentence in order to state a plausible asapplied claim under the Eighth Amendment.
I continue to believe that “[f]acial and asapplied challenges to execution protocols are

different,” that death row inmates “need not
plead a readily available alternative method
of execution” to bring an as-applied
challenge, and that “[a] state cannot be
excused from taking into account a particular
inmate’s existing physical disability or health
condition when assessing the propriety of its
execution method.” See id. at 1129 (Bye, J.,
concurring in the result). “While the Supreme
Court has been clear on the general
proposition that, so long as a state-imposed
death penalty is constitutional, there must be
some way for states to carry out executions,
the Supreme Court has also been clear that
some individuals cannot be executed.” Id. at
1130 (collecting cases); see also Madison v.
Alabama, 138 S. Ct. ___, 2018 WL 514241
(Feb. 26, 2018); Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct.
9, 12 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In my
view, neither Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct.
2726 (2015), nor any subsequent case from
the United States Supreme Court dictates the
result this court reached on this issue in
Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120 (8th
Cir. 2015) (en banc).

Russell Bucklew Appellant
v.
Anne L. Precythe, Director of the Department of Corrections, et al. Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Decided on March 6, 2018
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LOKEN, Circuit Judge
The issue is whether the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as applied, bar
Missouri officials from employing a
procedure that is authorized by Missouri
statute to execute Russell Bucklew.
In March 2006, Bucklew stole a car;
armed himself with pistols, handcuffs, and a
roll of duct tape; and followed his former
girlfriend, Stephanie Ray, to the home of
Michael Sanders, where she was living.
Bucklew knocked and entered the trailer with
a pistol in each hand when Sanders’s son
opened the door. Sanders took the children to
the back room and grabbed a shotgun.
Bucklew began shooting. Two bullets struck
Sanders, one piercing his chest. Bucklew
fired at Sanders’s six-year- old son, but
missed. As Sanders bled to death, Bucklew
struck Ray in the face with a pistol,
handcuffed Ray, dragged her to the stolen
car, drove away, and raped Ray in the back
seat of the car. He was apprehended by the
highway patrol after a gun- fight in which
Bucklew and a trooper were wounded.
A Missouri state court jury convicted
Bucklew of murder, kidnaping, and rape. The
trial court sentenced Bucklew to death, as the

jury had recommended. His conviction and
sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. banc
1998). The trial court denied his petition for
post-conviction relief, and the Supreme
Court of Missouri again affirmed. Bucklew v.
State, 38 S.W.3d 395 (Mo. banc 2001). We
subsequently affirmed the district court’s
denial of Bucklew’s petition for a federal writ
of habeas corpus. Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436
F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006). The Supreme
Court of Missouri issued a writ of execution
for May 21, 2014. Bucklew filed this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
execution by Missouri’s lethal injection
protocol, authorized by statute, would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments as applied to him because of his
unique medical condition. Bucklew appeals
the district court’s 1 grant of summary
judgment in favor of the state defendants
because Bucklew failed to present adequate
evidence to establish his claim under the
governing standard established by the
Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35,
128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008), and
Glossip v. Gross, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct.
2726, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015). Reviewing
the grant of summary judgment de novo, we
affirm.

I.
[1] Missouri’s method of execution is
by injection of a lethal dose of the drug
pentobarbital. Two days before his scheduled
execution in 2014, the district court denied
Bucklew’s motion for a stay of execution and
dismissed this as-applied action sua sponte.
On appeal, a divided panel granted a stay of
execution, Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565
Fed.Appx. 562 (8th Cir. 2014); the court en
banc vacated the stay. Bucklew applied to the
Supreme Court for a stay of execution, and
the Court issued an Order granting his
application ‘‘for stay pending appeal in the
Eighth Circuit.’’ This court, acting en banc,
reversed the sua sponte dismissal of
Bucklew’s as-applied Eighth Amendment
claim and remanded to the district court for
further proceedings. Bucklew v. Lombardi,
783 F.3d 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 2015)
(‘‘Bucklew I’’). On the same day, the en banc
court affirmed the district court’s dismissal
on the merits of a facial challenge to
Missouri’s lethal injection protocol filed by
several inmates sentenced to death, including
Bucklew. Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089,
1114 (8th Cir.), cert denied, ––– U.S. ––––,
135 S.Ct. 2941, 192 L.Ed.2d 976 (2015).
Our decision in Bucklew I set forth in
considerable detail the allegations in
Bucklew’s as-applied complaint regarding
his medical condition. 783 F.3d at 1124-26.
Bucklew has long suffered from a congenital
condition called cavernous hemangioma,
which causes clumps of weak, malformed
blood vessels and tumors to grow in his face,
head, neck, and throat. The large, inoperable
tumors fill with blood, periodically rupture,
and partially obstruct his airway. In addition,

the condition affects his circulatory system,
and he has compromised peripheral veins in
his hands and arms. In his motion for a stay
of execution in Bucklew I, Bucklew argued:
Dr. Joel Zivot, a board-certified
anesthesinologist . . . concluded after
reviewing Mr. Bucklew’s medical
records that a substantial risk existed
that, because of Mr. Bucklew’s
vascular malformation, the lethal
drug will likely not circulate as
intended, creating a substantial risk of
a ‘‘prolonged and extremely painful
execution.’’ Dr. Zivot also concluded
that a very substantial risk existed that
Mr. Bucklew would hemorrhage
during the execution, potentially
choking on his own blood—a risk
greatly heightened by Mr. Bucklew’s
partially obstructed airway.
*

*

*

*

*

[The Department of Corrections has
advised it would not use a dye in
flushing the intravenous line because
Dr. Zivot warned that might cause a
spike in Bucklew’s blood pressure.]
Reactionary changes at the eleventh
hour, without the guidance of
imaging or tests, create a substantial
risk to Mr. Bucklew, who suffers
from a complex and severe medical
condition that has compromised his
veins.
*

*

*

*

*

The DOC seems to acknowledge they
agree with Dr. Zivot that Mr.

Bucklew’s
obstructed
airway
presents substantial risks of needless
pain and suffering, but what they plan
to do about it is a mystery. Will they
execute Mr. Bucklew in a seated
position? . . . The DOC should be
required to disclose how it plans to
execute Mr. Bucklew so that this
Court can properly assess whether
additional risks are present. TTT
Until Mr. Bucklew knows what
protocol the DOC will use to kill him,
and until the DOC is required to
conduct the necessary imaging and
testing to quantify the expansion of
Mr. Bucklew’s hemangiomas and the
extent of his airway obstruction, it is
not possible to execute him without
substantial risk of severe pain and
needless suffering.
Defendants’
Suggestions
in
Opposition
argued
that
Bucklew’s
‘‘proposed changes . . . with the exception of
his complaint about [dye], which Missouri
will not use in Bucklew’s execution, are not
really changes in the method of execution.’’
[2, 3] Glossip and Baze established
two requirements for an Eighth Amendment
challenge to a method of execution. First, the
challenger must ‘‘establish that the method
presents a risk that is sure or very likely to
cause serious illness and needless suffering,
and give rise to sufficiently imminent
dangers.’’ Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2737
(emphasis in original), citing Baze, 553 U.S.
at 50, 128 S.Ct. 1520. This evidence must
show that the pain and suffering being risked
is severe in relation to the pain and suffering
that is accepted as inherent in any method of

execution. Id. at 2733. Second, the challenger
must ‘‘identify an alternative that is feasible,
readily implemented, and in fact significantly
reduces a substantial risk of severe pain.’’
Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2737, citing Baze, 553
U.S. at 52, 128 S.Ct. 1520. This two-part
standard governs as-applied as well as facial
challenges to a method of execution. See,
e.g., Jones v. Kelley, 854 F.3d 1009, 1013,
1016 (8th Cir. 2017); Williams v. Kelley, 854
F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2017); Johnson v.
Lombardi, 809 F.3d 388, 390 (8th Cir. 2015);
Bucklew I, 783 F.3d at 1123, 1127. As a panel
we are bound by these controlling precedents.
Bucklew argues the second Baze/Glossip
requirement of a feasible alternative method
of execution that substantially reduces the
risk of suffering should not apply to ‘‘an
individual who is simply too sick and
anomalous to execute in a constitutional
manner,’’ like those who may not be
executed for mental health reasons. See, e.g.,
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106
S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). The
Supreme Court has not recognized a
categorical exemption from the death penalty
for individuals with physical ailments or
disabilities. Thus, in the decision on appeal,
the district court properly applied the
Baze/Glossip two-part standard in dismissing
Bucklew’s as-applied claim.
We concluded in Bucklew I, based on
a record ‘‘which went well beyond the four
corners of Bucklew’s complaint,’’ that the
complaint’s allegations, bolstered by
defendants’
concession
‘‘that
the
Department’s lethal injection procedure
would be changed on account of his condition
by eliminating the use of methylene blue
dye,’’ sufficiently alleged the first

requirement of an as-applied challenge to the
method of execution—‘‘a substantial risk of
serious and imminent harm that is sure or
very likely to occur.’’ 783 F.3d at 1127. We
further concluded the district court’s sua
sponte dismissal was premature because
these detailed allegations made it
inappropriate ‘‘to assume that Bucklew
would decline an invitation to amend the asapplied challenge’’ to plausibly allege a
feasible and more humane alternative method
of execution, the second requirement under
the Baze/Glossip standard. Id. In remanding,
we directed that further proceedings ‘‘be
narrowly tailored and expeditiously
conducted to address only those issues that
are essential to resolving’’ the as- applied
challenge. Id. at 1128. We explained:
Bucklew’s arguments on appeal raise
an inference that he is impermissibly
seeking merely to investigate the
protocol without taking a position as
to what is needed to fix it. He may not
be ‘‘permitted to supervise every step
of the execution process.’’ Rather, at
the earliest possible time, he must
identify
a
feasible,
readily
implemented alternative procedure
that will significantly reduce a
substantial risk of severe pain and that
the State refuses to adopt. . . . Any
assertion that all methods of
execution are unconstitutional does
not state a plausible claim under the
Eighth Amendment or a cognizable
claim under § 1983.
Id. (quotation omitted; emphasis in original).
II.

On remand, consistent with our
directive, the district court first ordered
Bucklew to file an amended complaint that
adequately
identified
an
alternative
procedure. Twice, Bucklew filed amended
complaints that failed to comply with this
order. Given one last chance to comply or
face dismissal, on October 13, 2015,
Bucklew filed a Fourth Amended Complaint.
As relevant here, it alleged:
106. Based on Mr. Bucklew’s unique
and severe condition, there is no way
to proceed with Mr. Bucklew’s
execution under Missouri’s lethal
injection
protocol
without
a
substantial risk to Mr. Bucklew of
suffering grave adverse events during
the
execution,
including
hemorrhaging,
suffocating
or
experiencing excruciating pain.
107. Under any scenario or with any
of lethal drug, execution by lethal
injection poses an enormous risk that
Mr. Bucklew will suffer extreme,
excruciating and prolonged pain—all
accompanied by choking and
struggling for air.
128. In May 2014, the DOC also
proposed a second adjustment in its
protocol, offering to adjust the gurney
so that Mr. Bucklew is not lying
completely prone. . . . As a practical
matter, no adjustment would likely be
sufficient, as the stress of the
execution may unavoidably cause Mr.
Bucklew’s hemangiomas to rupture,
leading to hemorrhaging, bleeding in
his throat and through his facial

orifices, and coughing and choking
on his own blood.
129. In order to fully evaluate and
establish the risks to Mr. Bucklew
from execution by lethal injection, a
full and complete set of imaging
studies must be conducted.
139. Mr. Bucklew is mindful of the
Court’s directive to allege a feasible,
readily implemented alternative
procedure . . . Mr. Bucklew has
complied . . . by researching and
proposing execution by lethal gas,
which is specifically authorized by
Missouri law and which Missouri’s
Attorney General has stated the DOC
is prepared to implement.
150. In adherence with the pleading
requirements set forth in Glossip, and
as stated above, Mr. Bucklew
specifically alleges lethal gas as a
feasible and available alternative
method that will significantly reduce
the risk of severe pain to Mr.
Bucklew.
In other words, Bucklew took the
position that no modification of Missouri’s
lethal injection method of execution could be
constitutionally applied to execute Bucklew.
He proposed massive discovery allegedly
needed to establish the first Baze/Glossip
requirement. But his legal theory is that
alternative procedures such as adjusting the
gurney’s position are irrelevant because no
lethal injection procedure would be
constitutional, only a change to the use of
lethal gas would be adequate.

Bucklew’s as-applied claim focused
on two aspects of his medical condition. First,
Bucklew’s experts initially opined that his
peripheral veins are so weak that injection of
a lethal dose of pentobarbital would not
adequately circulate, leading to a prolonged
and painful execution. The district court
concluded that discovery and expert opinions
developed on remand refuted this claim. The
lethal injection protocol provides that
medical personnel may insert the primary
intravenous (IV) line ‘‘as a central venous
line’’ and may dispense with a secondary
peripheral IV line if ‘‘the prisoner’s physical
condition makes it unduly difficult to insert
more than one IV.’’ Bucklew’s expert Dr.
Zivot conceded, and Defendants’ expert, Dr.
Joseph Antognini, agreed, that the central
femoral vein can circulate a ‘‘fair amount of
fluid’’ without serious risk of rupture and that
Bucklew’s medical condition will not affect
the flow of pentobarbital after it is injected
through this vein.
Second, Bucklew’s experts opined
that his condition will cause him to
experience severe choking and suffocation
during execution by lethal injection. When
Bucklew is supine, gravity pulls the
hemangioma tumor into his throat which
causes his breathing to be labored and the
tumor to rupture and bleed. When conscious,
Bucklew can ‘‘adjust’’ his breathing with
repeated swallowing that prevents the tumor
from blocking his airway. But during the
‘‘twilight stage’’ of a lethal injection
execution, Dr. Zivot opined that Bucklew
will be aware he is choking on his own blood
and in pain before the pentobarbital renders
him unconscious and unaware of pain. Based
on a study of lethal injections in horses, Dr.

Zivot estimated there could be a period as
short as 52 seconds and as long as 240
seconds when Bucklew is conscious but
immobile and unable to adjust his breathing;
his attempts to breath will create friction,
causing the tumor to bleed and possibly
hemorrhage. In Dr. Zivot’s opinion, there is a
‘‘very, very high likelihood’’ that Bucklew
will suffer ‘‘choking complications,
including visible hemorrhaging,’’ if he is
executed by any means of lethal injection,
including using the drug pentobarbital.
According to Defendants’ expert, Dr.
Antognini, pentobarbital causes death by
‘‘producing rapid, deep unconscious[ness],
respiratory depression, followed by TTT
complete absence of respiration, decreased
oxygen levels, slowing of the heart, and then
the heart stopping.’’ In contrast to Dr. Zivot,
Dr. Antognini opined that pentobarbital
would
cause
‘‘rapid
and
deep
unconsciousness’’ within 20-30 seconds of
entering Bucklew’s blood stream, rendering
him insensate to bleeding and choking
sensations. Dr. Antognini also challenged Dr.
Zivot’s opinion that a supine Bucklew,
unable to adjust his breathing, will be aware
he is choking on his own blood and in pain
from the tumor blocking his airway before
the pentobarbital renders him unconscious.
Dr. Antognini noted that, between 2000 and
2003, Bucklew underwent general anesthesia
eight times, at least once in a supine position.
In December 2016, Bucklew lay supine for
over an hour undergoing an MRI, with no
more than discomfort. The MRI revealed that
his tumor had slightly shrunk since 2010.
In granting defendants summary
judgment, the district court declined to rely

on the first Glossip/Baze requirement
because these conflicting expert opinions
‘‘would permit a factfinder to conclude that
for as long as four minutes [after the injection
of pentobarbital Bucklew] could be aware
that he is choking or unable to breathe but be
unable [to] ‘adjust’ his breathing to remedy
the situation.’’ Rather, the court held that
Bucklew failed to provide adequate evidence
that his alternative method of execution—
lethal gas—was a ‘‘feasible, readily
implemented’’ alternative that would ‘‘in fact
significantly reduce a substantial risk of
severe pain’’ as compared to lethal injection.
Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2737; Baze, 553 U.S. at
52, 128 S.Ct. 1520.
III.
To succeed in his challenge to
Missouri’s lethal injection execution
protocol, Bucklew must establish both
prongs of the Glossip/Baze standard. Glossip,
135 S. Ct. at 2737. The district court held that
Bucklew failed to establish the second prong
of Glossip/Baze by showing that an
alternative method of execution would ‘‘in
fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of
severe pain.’’ As noted, Bucklew argues the
Glossip/Baze standard should not apply to an
as-applied challenge to a method of
execution, an argument our controlling
precedents have rejected. He raises two
additional issues on appeal.
[4] A. Bucklew first argues the
district court erred in granting summary
judgment on the second Glossip/Baze
requirement because he presented sufficient
evidence that his proposed alternative
method of execution—death through

nitrogen gas-induced hypoxia—‘‘would
substantially
reduce
his
suffering.’’
Summary judgment is not appropriate when
there are material issues of disputed fact, and
the Supreme Court in Glossip made clear that
this issue may require findings of fact that are
reviewed for clear error. See 135 S.Ct. at
2739-41 (majority opinion) and 2786
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). However,
whether a method of execution ‘‘constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment is a question of
law.’’ Swindler v. Lockhart, 885 F.2d 1342,
1350 (8th Cir. 1989). Thus, unless there are
material underlying issues of disputed fact, it
is appropriate to resolve this ultimate issue of
law by summary judgment.
[5] Nitrogen hypoxia is an authorized
method of execution under Missouri Law.
See Mo. Stat. Ann. § 546.720. Missouri has
not used this method of execution since 1965
and does not currently have a protocol in
place for execution by lethal gas. But there
are ongoing studies of the method in other
States and at least preliminary indications
that Missouri will undertake to develop a
protocol. Defendants do not argue this is not
a feasible and available alternative.
The district court granted summary
judgment based on Bucklew’s failure to
provide adequate evidence that execution by
nitrogen hypoxia would substantially reduce
the risk of pain or suffering. The court
allowed Bucklew extensive discovery into
defendants’ knowledge regarding execution
by lethal gas. But Missouri’s lack of recent
experience meant that this discovery
produced little relevant evidence and no
evidence that the risk posed by lethal
injection is substantial when compared to the

risk posed by lethal gas. See Glossip, 135
S.Ct. at 2738; Johnson, 809 F.3d at 391.
Bucklew’s theory is that execution by
nitrogen hypoxia would render Bucklew
insensate more quickly than lethal injection
and would not cause choking and bleeding in
his tumor-blocked airway. But his expert, Dr.
Zivot, provided no support for this theory.
Dr. Zivot’s Supplemental Expert Report
explained:
[W]hile I can assess Mr. Bucklew’s
current medical status and render an
expert opinion as to the documented
and significant risks associated with
executing Mr. Bucklew under
Missouri’s
current
Execution
Procedure, I cannot advise counsel or
the Court on how to execute Mr.
Bucklew in a way that would satisfy
Constitutional requirements.
Lacking affirmative comparative
evidence, Bucklew relied on Dr. Antognini’s
deposition. In his Expert Report, Dr.
Antognini concluded that ‘‘the use of lethal
gas would not significantly lessen any
suffering or be less painful than lethal
injection in this inmate.’’ At his deposition,
Dr. Antognini was asked:
Q. Why does lethal gas not hold any
advantage compared to lethal injection.
A. Well . . . there are a lot of types of gases
that could be used . . . [U]sing gas would not
significantly lessen any suffering or be less
painful. Because, again, their onset of action
is going to be relatively fast, just like
Pentobarbital’s onset—onset of action.

Q. That’s it? Simply because it would happen
quickly?
A. Correct.
The district court concluded this opinion
provided nothing to compare:
Dr. Antognini specifically stated that
he believed there would be no
difference in the ‘‘speed’’ of lethal
gas as compared to pentobarbital. . . .
In the absence of evidence
contradicting Defendants’ expert and
supporting Plaintiff’s theory, there is
not a triable issue.
On appeal, Bucklew argues the
district court should have compared Dr.
Zivot’s opinion that lethal injection would
take up to four minutes to cause Bucklew’s
brain death with Dr. Antognini’s testimony
that lethal gas would render him unconscious
in the same amount of time as lethal injection,
20 to 30 seconds. But Dr. Antognini’s
comparative testimony was that both
methods would result in unconsciousness in
approximately the same amount of time.
Bucklew offered no contrary comparative
evidence and thus the district court correctly
concluded that he failed to satisfy his burden
to provide evidence ‘‘establishing a known
and available alternative that would
significantly reduce a substantial risk of
severe pain.’’ McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854
F.3d 488, 493 (8th Cir. 2017).
In addition, Bucklew’s claim that he
will experience choking sensations during an
execution by lethal injection but not by

nitrogen hypoxia rests on the proposition that
he could be seated during the latter but not the
former. He argues there is evidence he will be
forced to remain supine during an execution
by lethal injection, when his tumor will cause
him to sense he is choking on his own blood,
whereas he could remain seated during the
administration of lethal gas, which would not
cause a choking sensation. But this argument
lacks factual support in the record. Having
taken the position that any lethal injection
procedure would violate the Eighth
Amendment, Bucklew made no effort to
determine what changes, if any, the DOC
would make in applying its lethal injection
protocol in executing Bucklew, other than
defendants advising—prior to remand by this
court—that dye would not be used.
Based on Bucklew’s argument to the
en banc court, we expected that the core of
the proceedings on remand would be defining
what changes defendants would make on
account of Bucklew’s medical condition and
then evaluating that modified procedure
under the two-part Baze/Glossip standard. On
remand, Director of Corrections Ann
Precythe testified that the medical members
of the execution team are provided a
prisoner’s medical history in preparing for
the execution. Precythe has authority to make
changes in the execution protocol, such as
how the primary IV line will be inserted in
the central femoral vein or how the gurney
will be positioned, if the team advises that
changes are needed. While Bucklew sought
and was denied discovery of the identities of
the execution team’s medical members, he
never urged the district court to establish a
suitable
fact-finding
procedure—for
example, by anonymous interrogatories or

written deposition questions to the execution
team members—for discovery of facts
needed for the DOC to define the as-applied
lethal injection protocol it intends to use for
Bucklew. As Bucklew did not pursue these
issues, the pleadings established that
defendants have proposed to reposition the
gurney during Bucklew’s deposition, and
Director Precythe testified that she has
authority to make this type of change in the
execution protocol based on the execution
team’s advice based on review of Bucklew’s
medical history, but the record does not
disclose whether Bucklew will in fact be
supine during the execution, nor does it
disclose that a ‘‘cut-down’’ procedure will
not be used to place the primary IV line in his
central femoral vein, a procedure Dr.
Antognini opined was unnecessary. Bucklew
simply asserts that, in comparing execution
by lethal injection and by lethal gas, we must
accept his speculation that defendants will
employ these risk- increasing procedures.
This we will not do.
[6] Like the district court, we
conclude the summary judgment record
contains no basis to conclude that Bucklew’s
risk of severe pain would be substantially
reduced by use of nitrogen hypoxia instead of
lethal injection as the method of execution.
Evidence that ‘‘is equivocal, lacks scientific
consensus and presents a paucity of reliable
scientific evidence’’ does not establish that
an execution is sure or very likely to cause
serious illness and needless suffering.
Williams v. Kelley, 854 F.3d at 1001
(quotation omitted). Therefore, he failed to
establish the second prong of the
Glossip/Baze standard.

[7] B. Bucklew further contends the
district court erred in denying his requests for
discovery relating to ‘‘M2’’ and ‘‘M3,’’ two
members of the lethal injection execution
team. Bucklew argues he was entitled to
discovery of the medical technicians’
qualifications, training, and experience
because it would ‘‘illuminate the nature and
extent of the risks of suffering he faces.’’ For
example, if M3 was not qualified to safely
place his IV in the central femoral vein, this
would directly impact the risk of pain and
suffering. We review a district court’s
discovery rulings narrowly and with great
deference and will reverse only for a ‘‘gross
abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental
unfairness.’’ Marksmeier v. Davie, 622 F.3d
896, 903 (8th Cir. 2010).
[8–10] Bucklew’s argument proceeds
from the premise that M2 and M3 may not be
qualified for the positions for which they
have been hired. But we will not assume that
Missouri employs personnel who are
incompetent or unqualified to perform their
assigned duties. See Clemons v. Crawford,
585 F.3d 1119, 1128 (8th Cir. 2009). He
further argues that deposition of M2 and M3
is necessary to understand how they will
handle a circumstance in case something
goes wrong during Bucklew’s execution. The
potentiality that something may go wrong in
an execution does not give rise to an Eighth
Amendment violation. Zink, 783 F.3d at
1101. ‘‘Some risk of pain is inherent in any
method of execution—no matter how
humane— if only from the prospect of error
in following the required procedure. . . . [A]n
isolated mishap alone does not give rise to an
Eighth Amendment violation.’’ Baze, 553
U.S. at 47, 50, 128 S.Ct. 1520. Thus, the

district court’s ruling was consistent with our
instruction in remanding that Bucklew ‘‘may
not be permitted to supervise every step of the
execution process.’’ Bucklew I, 783 F.3d at
1128 (quotation omitted). The Baze/Glossip
evaluation must be based on the as-applied
pre-execution protocol, assuming that those
responsible for carrying out the sentence are
competent and qualified to do so, and that the
procedure will go as intended.
III. Conclusion
Having thoroughly reviewed the
record, we conclude that Bucklew has failed
to establish that lethal injection, as applied to
him, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Therefore, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Russell Bucklew alleges that the State
of Missouri’s method of execution by lethal
injection violates his rights under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. He seeks an
injunction prohibiting an execution by that
method. The district court granted summary
judgment for the State, but there are genuine
disputes of material fact that require findings
of fact by the district court before this dispute
can be resolved. I would therefore remand the
case for the district court promptly to conduct
further proceedings.
Bucklew’s claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 requires him to prove two elements: (1)
that the State’s method of execution is sure or
very likely to cause him severe pain, and (2)
that an alternative method of execution that is

feasible and readily implemented would
significantly reduce the substantial risk of
severe pain. Glossip v. Gross, ––– U.S. ––––
, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2737, 192 L.Ed.2d 761
(2015); Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120,
1123, 1128 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc). On the
first element, the district court concluded that
taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to Bucklew, there is a substantial
risk under Missouri’s lethal injection
protocol that Bucklew will experience
choking and an inability to breathe for up to
four minutes. On the second element,
however, the court ruled as a matter of law
that Bucklew’s suggested alternative
method—execution by administration of
nitrogen gas—would not significantly reduce
the substantial risk that the court identified
under the first element. In my view, the
district court’s reasoning as to the first
element is inconsistent with its summary
disposition of Bucklew’s claim on the
second.
On the first element, Bucklew’s
theory is that he will suffer severe pain by
prolonged choking or suffocation if the State
executes him by lethal injection. He contends
that when he lies supine on the execution
gurney, tumors in his throat will block his
airway unless he can ‘‘adjust’’ his
positioning to enable breathing. Bucklew
argues that if an injection of pentobarbital
renders him unable to adjust his positioning
while he can still sense pain, then he will
choke or suffocate.
In assessing that claim, the district
court cited conflicting expert testimony from
Bucklew’s expert, Dr. Joel Zivot, and the
State’s expert, Dr. Joseph Antognini. Dr.

Antognini testified that if the State proceeded
by way of lethal injection using
pentobarbital, then Bucklew would be
unconscious within twenty to thirty seconds
and incapable of experiencing pain at that
point. R. Doc. 182-5, at 10, 40-41. Dr. Zivot,
however, differed: ‘‘I strongly disagree with
Dr. Antognini’s repeated claim that the
pentobarbital injection would result in ‘rapid
unconsciousness’ and therefore Mr. Bucklew
would not experience any suffocating or
choking.’’ R. Doc. 182-1, at 147. Zivot
opined that Bucklew ‘‘would likely
experience unconsciousness that sets in
progressively as the chemical circulates
through his system,’’ and that ‘‘during this
in-between twilight stage,’’ Bucklew ‘‘is
likely to experience prolonged feelings of
suffocation and excruciating pain.’’ Id.
In his deposition, Dr. Zivot opined
that ‘‘there will be points,’’ before Bucklew
dies, ‘‘where he’s beginning to experience
the effects of the pentobarbital, where his
ability to control and regulate and adjust his
airway will be impaired, although there will
still be the experience capable of knowing
that he cannot make the adjustment, and will
experience it as choking.’’ Id. at 81. When
directed to Dr. Antognini’s opinion that
Bucklew would be unaware of noxious
stimuli within twenty to thirty seconds of a
pentobarbital injection, Dr. Zivot observed
that Antognini’s opinion was based on a
study involving dogs from fifty years ago and
testified that his ‘‘number would be longer
than that.’’ Id. at 85. When asked for his
‘‘number,’’ Dr. Zivot pointed to a study on
lethal injections administered to horses; he
said the study recorded ‘‘a range of as short
as fifty-two seconds and as long as about two

hundred and forty seconds before they see
isoelectric EEG.’’ Id. at 85-86. Dr. Zivot
noted that the ‘‘number’’ that he derived
from the horse study was ‘‘more than twice
as long as’’ the number suggested by Dr.
Antognini. Id. at 86. He defined ‘‘isoelectric
EEG’’ as ‘‘indicative of at least electrical
silence on the parts of the brain that the
electroencephalogram has access to.’’ Id.
The district court observed that ‘‘[a]n
execution is typically conducted with the
prisoner lying on his back,’’ and that the
record ‘‘establishes that [Bucklew] has
difficulty breathing while in that position
because the tumors can cause choking or an
inability to breathe.’’ The court understood
Dr. Zivot to mean that ‘‘it could be fifty- two
to 240 seconds before the pentobarbital
induces a state in which [Bucklew] could no
longer sense that he is choking or unable to
breathe.’’ Thus, the court concluded that
‘‘construing the Record in [Bucklew’s] favor
reveals that it could be fifty-two to 240
seconds before the pentobarbital induces a
state in which [Bucklew] could no longer
sense that he is choking or unable to
breathe.’’ Again, the court reasoned that ‘‘the
facts construed in [Bucklew’s] favor would
permit a factfinder to conclude that for as
long as four minutes [Bucklew] could be
aware that he is choking or unable to breathe
but be unable to ‘adjust’ his breathing to
remedy the situation.’’ On that basis, the
court presumed for purposes of the motion
for summary judgment that ‘‘there is a
substantial risk that [Bucklew] will
experience choking and an inability to
breathe for up to four minutes.’’

The State disputes that there is a
genuine dispute of material fact on the first
element of Bucklew’s claim, but the district
court properly concluded that findings of fact
were required. Bucklew pointed to evidence
from Missouri corrections officials that
prisoners have always laid flat on their backs
during executions by lethal injection in
Missouri. R. Doc. 182-7, at 10; R. Doc. 1829, at 1; R. Doc. 182-12, at 29, 91. One official
testified that he did not know whether the
gurney could be adjusted. R. Doc. 182-12, at
91. Another official believed that the head of
the gurney ‘‘could’’ be raised (or that a
gurney with that capability could be
acquired), and that an anesthesiologist would
have ‘‘the freedom’’ to adjust the gurney
‘‘if’’ he or she determined that it would be in
the best medical interest of the offender to do
so. R. Doc. 182-7, at 14. But the State did not
present evidence about how it would position
Bucklew or the gurney during his execution.
On a motion for summary judgment, the
district court was required to construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to
Bucklew. Under that standard, without
undisputed evidence from the State that it
would alter its ordinary procedures, the court
did not err by concluding that a finder of fact
could infer that the State would proceed as in
all other executions, with Bucklew lying on
his back.
The State argues that the district court
erred in discerning a genuine dispute of
material fact on the first element because Dr.
Zivot did not specify the length of the
expected ‘‘twilight stage’’ during which
Bucklew would be unable to adjust his
positioning yet still sense pain. The State also
complains that Dr. Zivot did not specify that

Bucklew’s pain awareness would continue
for fifty-two seconds or longer until brain
waves ceased. There certainly are grounds to
attack the reliability and credibility of Dr.
Zivot’s opinion, including the imprecision of
some of his testimony, his opposition to all
forms of lethal injection, his possible
misreading of the horse study on which he
partially relied, and his inaccurate predictions
of calamities at prior executions. But he did
opine that Bucklew was likely to
‘‘experience
prolonged
feelings
of
suffocation and excruciating pain’’ if
executed by lethal injection, R. Doc. 182-1,
at 147, and that there ‘‘will be points’’ before
Bucklew dies when his ability to regulate his
airway will be impaired so that he ‘‘will
experience it as choking.’’ Id. at 81. The
district court did not err in concluding that it
could not resolve the dispute between the
experts on summary judgment.
On the second element of Bucklew’s
claim, the district court concluded as a matter
of law that Bucklew failed to show that his
proposed alternative method of execution—
administration of nitrogen gas—would
significantly reduce the substantial risk of
severe pain that the court recognized under
the first element. The majority affirms the
district court’s judgment on this basis. Taking
the evidence in the light most favorable to
Bucklew, however, a factfinder could
conclude that nitrogen gas would render
Bucklew insensate more quickly than
pentobarbital and would thus eliminate the
risk that he would experience prolonged
feelings of choking or suffocation. Dr.
Antognini testified that a person who is
administered nitrogen gas ‘‘would be
unconscious very quickly,’’ and that the

onset of action from lethal gas ‘‘is going to
be relatively fast, just like Pentobarbital’s
onset.’’ R. Doc. 182-5, at 58-59 (emphasis
added). Given Dr. Antognini’s testimony that
pentobarbital would render Bucklew
insensate within twenty to thirty seconds, the
record in the light most favorable to Bucklew
supports a finding based on Antognini’s
testimony that nitrogen gas would relieve
Bucklew from any pain of choking or
suffocating within twenty to thirty seconds. A
trier of fact may accept all, some, or none of
a witness’s testimony, United States v.
Candie, 974 F.2d 61, 65 (8th Cir. 1992), and
a plaintiff may rely on testimony from the
defendant’s expert to meet his burden if the
testimony is advantageous to the plaintiff.
See IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy
Co., Inc., 818 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 2016).
If the factfinder accepted Dr. Zivot’s
testimony as to the effect of pentobarbital,
and Dr. Antognini’s uncontroverted
testimony as to effect of nitrogen gas, then
Bucklew’s proposed alternative method
would significantly reduce the substantial
risk of severe pain that the district court
identified in its analysis of the first element.
For these reasons, there are genuine
disputes of material fact that preclude
summary judgment and require findings of
fact by the district court. I would therefore
remand the case for further proceedings. The
district court may then promptly make
appropriate factual findings about, among
other things, how Bucklew will be positioned
during an execution, whether his airway will
be blocked during an execution, and how
pentobarbital (and, if necessary, nitrogen gas)
will affect his consciousness and ability to
sense potential pain.

*

*

*

The State contends that we should not
reach the merits of Bucklew’s claim because
several procedural obstacles require
dismissal of his complaint. The majority does
not rely on these points, and I find them
unavailing.
First, the State contends that Bucklew
did not raise his present claim in his fourth
amended complaint. Bucklew’s complaint,
however, does allege the essence of his
current theory. The complaint asserts that the
tumors in Bucklew’s throat require ‘‘him to
sleep with his upper body elevated’’ because
if he lies flat, ‘‘the tumor then fully obstructs
his airway.’’ Id. at 18-19. It continued:
‘‘Executions are conducted on a gurney, and
the risks arising from Mr. Bucklew’s airway
are even greater if he is lying flat. Because of
the hemangiomas, Mr. Bucklew is unable to
sleep in a normal recumbent position because
the tumors cause greater obstruction in that
position.’’ R. Doc. 53, at 35. Bucklew further
alleged that execution by lethal injection
‘‘poses an enormous risk that Mr. Bucklew
will suffer extreme, excruciating and
prolonged pain—all accompanied by
choking and struggling for air.’’ Id. at 36. The
complaint was adequate under a notice
pleading regime to raise a claim that the
execution procedure would result in an
obstructed airway and choking or
suffocation.
If necessary, moreover, the district
court acted within its discretion by treating
the complaint as impliedly amended to
include Bucklew’s present claim. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(b)(2). Bucklew clearly notified the

State of his contention in his opposition to the
State’s motion for summary judgment. R.
Doc. 192-1, at 1-3, 11-17. Yet rather than
communicate surprise and object that the
claim was not pleaded, the State addressed
Bucklew’s contention on the merits. R. Doc.
200, at 4-5. Where a party has actual notice
of an unpleaded issue and has been given an
adequate opportunity to cure any surprise
resulting from a change in the pleadings,
there is implied consent to an amendment.
Trip Mate, Inc. v. Stonebridge Cas. Ins. Co.,
768 F.3d 779, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2014).
Second, the State argues that the fiveyear statute of limitations bars Bucklew’s
claim, because he was aware of his claim in
2008 and did not file his complaint until May
9, 2014. A claim under § 1983 accrues when
a plaintiff has ‘‘a complete and present cause
of action’’ and ‘‘can file suit and obtain
relief.’’ Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388,
127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007)
(quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,
522 U.S. 192, 201, 118 S.Ct. 542, 139
L.Ed.2d 553 (1997) ). Bucklew asserts that he
did not have knowledge of his present claim,
and therefore could not have filed suit and
obtained relief, until his medical condition
progressed and he was examined by Dr. Zivot
in April 2014. As evidence that Bucklew
could have brought his claim earlier, the State
relies on a 2008 petition that Bucklew
submitted to the Missouri Supreme Court.
The petition sought funding for an expert
witness to investigate the interaction of the
State’s existing execution protocol with
Bucklew’s health condition. The possible
claim addressed in the 2008 funding petition,
however, focused on the potential for uncon-

trolled bleeding and ineffective circulation of
drugs within Bucklew’s body under the
State’s former three-drug execution protocol.
The petition does not demonstrate that
Bucklew was then on notice of a claim that a
future execution protocol using the single
drug pentobarbital would create a substantial
risk of severe pain resulting from tumors
blocking his airway while laying supine
during an execution.
Third, the State urges that Bucklew’s
claim is barred by res judicata or claim
preclusion, because Bucklew could have
litigated his as-applied challenge to the
execution protocol in an earlier case styled
Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-04209-CV-C-BP.
In Zink, a group of inmates sentenced to
death, including Bucklew, brought a facial
challenge to Missouri’s execution protocol.
A complaint was filed in August 2012, and
the eventual deadline for motions to amend
pleadings was January 27, 2014. Principles of
claim preclusion do not bar Bucklew’s asapplied challenge if he was unaware of the
basis for the claim in time to include it in the
Zink litigation. See Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2292,
2305, 195 L.Ed.2d 665 (2016). The State
again points to Bucklew’s 2008 funding
petition in support of its preclusion defense,
but for reasons discussed, that petition does
not establish that Bucklew’s present claim
was available to him in 2008. At oral
argument, the State argued that Bucklew
could have added his as- applied challenge to
the Zink litigation after he was examined by
Dr. Zivot in April 2014, because the district
court granted the Zink plaintiffs leave to
amend their complaint in May 2014. But the
court’s order allowed the Zink plaintiffs leave

to amend only a single count of the complaint
to allege a feasible alternative method of
execution. The order did not reopen the
pleadings deadline for as-applied claims by
the several individual plaintiffs. See Zink v.
Lombardi, No. 12-04209- CV-C-BP, 2014
WL 11309998, at *4-5, 12 (W.D. Mo. May 2,
2014). The State therefore has not established
that Bucklew’s as- applied claim is barred by
res judicata.

*

*

*

For these reasons, I would reverse the
judgment of the district court and remand for
further proceedings to be conducted with
dispatch.

“Supreme Court to Hear Cases on Death Penalty and Class Actions”

The New York Times
Adam Liptak

April 30, 2018
[Parts of the Article are Omitted.]
The court agreed to hear an appeal from a
death row inmate in Missouri with a rare
medical condition that he says will cause
excruciating pain if he is put to death by
lethal injection. Lawyers for the inmate,
Russell Bucklew, said his condition,
cavernous hemangioma, would make him
choke on his own blood during his execution.
In 2015, in Glossip v. Gross, the Supreme
Court ruled against inmates challenging
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol, saying
they had failed to identify an available and
preferable method of execution.
In the new case, Bucklew v. Precythe, No.
17-8151, Mr. Bucklew did propose an

alternative, saying lethal gas was preferable
to the state’s current method of an injection
of a lethal dose of pentobarbital. But the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in St. Louis, ruled in March that Mr.
Bucklew had not shown that his alternative
would be less painful.
Mr. Bucklew was convicted of murdering a
man who had been seeing his former
girlfriend and of kidnapping and raping her.
The Supreme Court stayed his execution in
March by a 5-to-4 vote.

“Death-Row Inmate With Rare Disease Gets U.S. Supreme Court Review
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr

April 30, 2018
The Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal
from a Missouri death-row inmate who says
his rare medical condition means the state’s
lethal-injection method probably would
cause him to choke on his own blood.
Convicted murderer Russell Bucklew, 49,
says Missouri’s execution protocol method
would be unconstitutional in his case because
he suffers from cavernous hemangioma, a
disease that has caused blood-filled tumors in
his head, neck and throat.
The Supreme Court broadly upheld lethal
injection a decade ago but left open the
possibility that individual inmates could
press challenges based on their own
particular circumstances.
The court voted 5-4 to halt Bucklew’s
execution on March 20 while the justices
considered whether to take up his appeal.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the swing vote on
death-penalty cases, voted with the court’s
liberal wing in the majority.

Bucklew, who has proposed the state look to
lethal gas an alternative way of killing him,
says a federal appeals court made a series of
errors in letting his execution go forward.
Bucklew says the appeals court improperly
assumed that the state’s medical team would
be able to manage his condition during the
execution.
Bucklew was convicted of bursting in the
home where his ex-girlfriend, Stephanie Ray,
was staying in 1996. Bucklew shot and killed
the homeowner, Michael Sanders, before
abducting Ray and raping her. He isn’t
challenging his conviction or death sentence.
Missouri Attorney General Josh Hawley
urged the Supreme Court not to hear the
appeal, saying Bucklew waited too long to
raise the issue and hasn’t provided enough
evidence of a risk of severe pain.
The case, which the court will hear during the
nine-month term that starts in October, is
Bucklew v. Precythe, 17-8151.

“Missouri appeal could delay Mississippi death penalty case”

Midland Reporter-Telegram
Jeff Amy

July 17, 2018
A Missouri appeal over whether lethal
injection would violate the Constitution's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment could delay
a Mississippi case over similar issues.
Lawyers for some death row inmates in
Mississippi are asking a federal judge to
postpone an August trial on Mississippi's
death penalty procedures. They say state
Attorney General Jim Hood doesn't oppose
the delay.
If U.S. District Judge Henry T. Wingate
agrees, no executions in Mississippi are
likely until after the Missouri case is decided.
Arguments in the Missouri case are set for
this fall, and a ruling might not come until
2019. Mississippi hasn't executed anyone
since 2012, in part because of legal
challenges to the state's lethal injection
methods, as well as the state's difficulty in
obtaining drugs.
The U.S. Supreme Court in April agreed to
review the Missouri case, brought by an
inmate named Russell Bucklew. The inmate
says his rare medical condition could cause
him to choke on his own blood during an
execution. The court blocked Bucklew's
execution in March after he argued that a

tumor in his throat is likely to rupture and
bleed during the administration of the drugs
that would be used to kill him.
Both the Missouri and the Mississippi cases
hinge on what an inmate must do to show an
alternate execution method is available that
would reduce risk of needless suffering.
That's required to meet a previous Supreme
Court ruling that says inmates challenging a
method of execution must show that there's
an alternative that is likely to be less painful.
In the Mississippi case, inmates are arguing
they should be put to death using a single
large dose of a barbiturate called
pentobarbital.
Mississippi prison officials have said they're
not going to use pentobarbital anymore
because they can't obtain the drug after
manufacturers opposed to its use in
executions cut off supplies. But lawyers for
the Mississippi inmates argue that doesn't
make any sense because Texas, Missouri and
Georgia continue to execute inmates using
pentobarbital that they're obtaining from
somewhere.
Lawyer Jim Craig, who represents some of
the inmates, said it would be a waste of time

to have a trial when the Supreme Court is
likely to clarify the law at issue.
Death row inmates in the Mississippi case
include Richard Jordan, sentenced for
kidnapping and killing a Harrison County
woman in 1976; Ricky Chase, sentenced for
the 1989 killing of a 70-year-old vegetable
salesman in Copiah County; Thomas Loden,
sentenced for the 2000 kidnapping, rape and

murder of an Itawamba County waitress;
Roger Thorson, sentenced for killing a
former girlfriend in Harrison County in 1987;
and Robert Simon, sentenced for the 1990
killings of three members of a Quitman
County family.
The Missouri case is Bucklew v. Precythe ,
17-8151.

Gamble v. United States
Ruling Below: United States v. Gamble, 694 Fed.Appx 750 (11th Cir. 2017)
Overview: Terance Martez Gamble was pulled over in 2015 for a broken tail light on his car when
a gun and drug paraphernalia was discovered in the car. Seven years prior, Gamble was convicted
of second-degree robbery and was barred from owning a firearm. Gamble was charged for illegal
possession of a firearm by the State of Alabama and the Federal Government, for the exact same
incident in 2015. Gamble claims that his federal indictment should be dismissed on the ground that
it violated his Fifth Amendment protection from Double Jeopardy.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court should overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the
double jeopardy clause.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA., Plaintiff- Appellee,
v.
TERANCE MARTEZ GAMBLE, Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided on July 28, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Before HULL, WILSON, and ANDERSON,
Circuit Judges.

We review de novo, as a pure
question of law, any possible violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v.
McIntosh, 580 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir.
2009).

PER CURIAM:
Terance Martez Gamble appeals his
conviction for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). Gamble argues that the district
court erred by determining that double
jeopardy did not prohibit the federal
government from prosecuting Gamble for the
same conduct for which he had been
prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of
Alabama.

The Supreme Court has determined
that prosecution in federal and state court for
the same conduct does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal
governments are separate sovereigns. Abbate
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195, 79 S. Ct.
666 (1959). We have followed the precedent
set by Abbate in Hayes, stating that unless
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and until the Supreme Court overturns
Abbate, the double jeopardy claim must fail
based on the dual sovereignty doctrine.
United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 817-18
(5th Cir. 1979). We have, more recently,
stated that “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause
does not prevent different sovereigns (i.e., a
state government and the federal
government) from punishing a defendant for
the same criminal conduct.” United States v.
Bidwell, 393 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
2004).

The district court did not err by
determining that double jeopardy did not
prohibit the federal government from
prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for
which he had been prosecuted and sentenced
for by the State of Alabama, because based
on Supreme Court precedent, dual
sovereignty allows a state government and
the federal government to prosecute an
individual for the same crime, when the
States rely on authority originally belonging
to them before admission to the Union and
preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment.
Accordingly, we affirm.

In Sanchez-Valle, the Supreme Court
stated that the states were separate sovereigns
from the federal government because the
States rely on authority originally belonging
to them before admission to the Union and
preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment.
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez-Valle, 579 U.S. __,
__, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1871 (2016). It explained
that prior to forming the Union, the States
possessed separate and independent sources
of power and authority, which they continue
to draw upon in enacting and enforcing
criminal laws. Id. State prosecutions
therefore have their most ancient roots in an
“inherent sovereignty” unconnected to, and
indeed pre-existing, the U.S. Congress. Id.
The Supreme Court differentiated Puerto
Rico from the States, stating that it was not a
sovereign distinct from the United States
because it had derived its authority from the
U.S. Congress. Id. at 1873-74. It concluded
that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars both
Puerto Rico and the United States from
prosecuting a single person for the same
conduct under equivalent criminal laws. Id. at
1876.

AFFIRMED.
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“Supreme Court agrees to take up double jeopardy issue”
NBC News
Pete Williams

June 28, 2018
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Thursday to
reconsider its long-standing view that putting
someone on trial more than once for the same
crime does not violate the Constitution's
protection against double jeopardy.

Lawyers for an Alabama man, Terance
Gamble, urged the justices to consider
overturning those earlier decisions.
Convicted of robbery in 2008, Gamble was
pulled over seven years later for a traffic
violation. Police found a handgun in his car,
so he was charged with violating Alabama's
law barring felons from possessing firearms.
The local U.S. attorney charged him with
violating a similar federal law. Because of the
added federal conviction, his prison sentence
was extended by three years.

Among the provisions of the Fifth
Amendment is that no person shall be
"subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb." That's popularly
understood to mean that nobody can be put
on trial twice for the same crime.
But in a line of cases stretching back more
than 150 years, the Supreme Court has ruled
that being prosecuted twice — once by a state
and again in federal court — doesn't violate
the clause because the states and the federal
government are "separate sovereigns."

Gamble's lawyers said the foundations for
those earlier rulings began to crumble in 1969
when the Supreme Court ruled that the
double jeopardy provision, originally meant
to be a check on federal power, also applied
to the states. It is inconsistent, they said, to let
parallel actions of state and federal officials
produce a result that would be impermissible
if done by either jurisdiction alone.

The court has held that when a defendant in a
single act breaks both a federal and a state
law, that amounts to two distinct offenses and
can result in two separate prosecutions.
Barring states from prosecuting someone
already tried in federal court "would be a
shocking and untoward deprivation of the
historic right and obligation of the states to
maintain peace and order within their
confines," the court has said.

And his lawyers said Congress has
dramatically expanded the number and scope
of federal laws in recent years, creating more
duplications with state laws, a problem the
earlier Supreme Court decisions never
envisioned.
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The court will hear Gamble's appeal in the
fall. He is set to be released from federal
prison in 2020.

217

“Upcoming SCOTUS Case Could Complicate NY Effort to Close Double
Jeopardy ‘Loophole’”

New York Law Journal
Colby Hamilton and Dan M. Clark

July 2, 2018
On June 28, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
to hear a case challenging the legal principle
that the federal government and those of the
states represent “separate sovereigns,” a
long-held doctrine that has provided a workaround for state and federal prosecutors faced
with constitutional double jeopardy concerns.

in President Donald Trump’s orbit. Under
certain circumstances, individuals close to
the president, facing federal prosecution,
could see a pardon absolve them of not only
federal charges, but bar state prosecutors
from bringing a similar case under New York
law.

In the case, captioned Gamble v. United
States, Terance Martez Gamble challenged
prosecutions over charges of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Those cases—which
resulted in convictions—were brought by
Alabama state prosecutors and U.S.
attorneys.

New York, like many states, currently does
not allow someone to be prosecuted on state
charges after a federal pardon. New York’s
loophole, according to the office of Attorney
General Barbara Underwood, allows for a
unique trick of the law: absent a specific
exemption, if a defendant pleads guilty, or if
a federal jury is sworn in at trial, state law
bars charging that defendant over the exact
same criminal acts.

Gamble argued the dual convictions violated
constitutional protection against facing
double jeopardy for the same offense. He is
currently serving nearly three additional
years in federal prison beyond his Alabama
state court sentence.

One such exemption is if a court nullifies a
prior criminal proceeding, such as when an
appellate court vacates a conviction.
However, state law does not speak to what
happens if the president were to issue a
strategically
timed
pardon
under
circumstances that triggered double jeopardy
protections.

The decision by the nation’s highest cout
comes at a critical moment for supporters of
changes
to
New
York’s
double
jeopardy protections that go beyond the Fifth
Amendment. Lawmakers and the state
Attorney General’s Office are pushing for the
close of a so-called loophole that could serve
as a kind of “get out of jail” scenario for those

The issue was raised most recently when
Trump pardoned conservative political
activist Dinesh D’Souza in May. D’Souza
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pleaded guilty to campaign finance fraud
before U.S. District Judge Richard Berman of
the Southern District of New York, and was
sentenced in September 2014 to five years of
probation.

vote?” Gallivan said. “But God forbid a
president, just like President Obama, just like
President Clinton, pardons somebody, now
we’re going to question the president just
because of what his party is?”

“We can’t afford to wait to see who will be
next,” Underwood said in a statement at the
time. “Lawmakers must act now to close
New York’s double jeopardy loophole and
ensure that anyone who evades federal justice
by virtue of a politically expedient pardon
can be held accountable if they violate New
York law.”

The bill’s sponsors will tell you that it’s not
about party, it’s about Trump. But as written
it would apply to his successors.
“This bill would not just apply to the current
president, it will apply to any president going
forward,” Kaminsky said. “I think the
president’s actions have laid bare a loophole
that needs to be closed.”

Things appeared to be moving forward
earlier this year when Democrats in the state
Legislature introduced a bill in April to
reverse that rule in New York. Assemblyman
Joe Lentol, D-Brooklyn, and Sen. Todd
Kaminsky, D-Long Beach, sponsored the bill
in their respective chambers.

That idea also turned out to be the other big
obstacle to the bill, Lentol said. Criminal
justice advocates were worried the legislation
would be used by prosecutors in New York
to bring charges indiscriminately against
people other than Trump and his allies.
“The major flaw with the bill is that it would
allow a lot of district attorneys power, and
sometimes maybe inappropriately charge
someone with a crime,” Lentol said. “The bill
has wide scope and I think we need to narrow
it in order for it to not be used by folks who
may be unscrupulous.”

The legislation was sent to committee in each
chamber, where it stayed through the end of
this year’s legislative session. There were
two reasons the bill did not make it to the
floor for a vote in either chamber. The most
obvious was Republican opposition in the
Senate. Sen. Patrick Gallivan, R-Elma, chairs
the Crime Victims, Crime and Correction
Committee in the Senate. He called the bill
“disgraceful” and compared it to Gov.
Andrew Cuomo’s executive order pardoning
thousands of parolees this year so they could
vote.

Kaminsky’s answer to that concern was a
section of the bill that exempts certain
offenders from also being charged by the
state. According to the bill, a state prosecutor
would not be able to bring charges against
someone if a “reprieve, pardon, or other form
of clemency was granted five years or more
after entry of judgment for such offense.”

“I think it’s disgraceful. It’s OK that the
governor pardons 35,000 people and has
parole officers handing out and directing
parolees, murderers, rapists, where they go to

“I think the exception that the bill already
contains is pretty broad,” Kaminsky said.
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Whatever concerns lawmakers in Albany
may have over the state’s move to deal with
double jeopardy issues may now have to
contend with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision to hear the Gamble case. New York
University School of Law professor Richard
Pildes called the move a highly significant
challenge to decades of doctrinal precedent.

Even if Gamble were to do away with the
separate sovereigns exception, Richman said,
“The question becomes, do the elements of
one prosecution overlap with the elements of
the other prosecution?”
In reality, this is so rarely the case that, for
Richman, the concern becomes largely an
academic one and “a bit of a red herring.”

“I thought it was quite dramatic that they
announced their decision to reconsider this
issue,” Pildes said. “At least four of them are
certainly very interested in whether the court
should engage in a major reconsideration of
the doctrine. I think you can read that much
into the grant.”

More often than not, when federal and state
charges are lined up, “there’s no overlap, or
almost no overlap, that would ring Fifth
Amendment chimes in the absence of the
dual sovereign analysis,” he said.
“This is just a reminder of the thinness of
federal double jeopardy protections, even
putting the dual sovereign protections aside,”
he added.

As the petition itself notes, interest in the
issue among the justices appears to be
growing. Quoting the court’s 2016 ruling
in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, Gamble
noted that both Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Clarence Thomas have called for a fresh
examination of the doctrine.

The potential impact of Gamble is, for now at
least, not deterring those in support of closing
the state’s double jeopardy loophole from
moving forward.

Pildes noted that it’s tough to bring a
challenge to the separate sovereigns
exception.

Lentol said he’s exploring other options to
garner support for the bill. One would allow
only the state attorney general to bring state
charges against someone who’s received a
federal pardon. That would help curb the
possibility of having a district attorney target
someone acquitted of a federal crime, Lentol
said.

“It’s very hard to have these cases teed up to
squarely present the issue,” he said.
Even Gamble noted in his petition that the
few cases that have been brought to challenge
the doctrine “have been riddled with vehicle
problems.” These challenges will ultimately
mean worries about the potential impact
of Gamble on any move by New York to
close its double jeopardy loophole are likely
to be unfounded, according to Columbia Law
School professor and former Manhattan
federal prosecutor Daniel Richman.

Another option would be to have the bill
sunset at the end of Trump’s presidency,
Lentol said.
Both options could build an appetite for the
legislation to pass during next year’s
legislative session. Kaminsky believes if the
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Senate passes the bill, the Assembly will
follow suit. That seems unlikely for now
while Republicans hold the majority in the

upper chamber. Democrats need to gain at
least one seat in this year’s election for that to
change.
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“Don’t Gamble on Double Jeopardy”
Cato Institute
Ilya Shapiro

December 4, 2017
as we’ve done before in Walker v.
Texas and Tyler v. United States, which
presented the same issue.

Terance Gamble was convicted of seconddegree robbery in Alabama in 2008. That’s a
felony, so he was barred from possessing a
firearm under both federal and state law.
Seven years later, Gamble was pulled over
for a broken taillight. Smelling marijuana, the
police officer searched the car and found,
among other things, a 9mm handgun.
Alabama prosecuted Gamble under its
“felon-in-possession” statute and he was
ultimately sentenced to a year in prison.
Concurrent with the state’s prosecution,
however, the U.S. attorney charged Gamble
with the same offense under federallaw. He
was sentenced to 46 months in prison and will
be released early in 2020, nearly three years
after he would have been released from state
prison.

We make three principal arguments. First,
none of the Framers would have
contemplated such a large exception to
Double Jeopardy protection. Even before the
Founding, English jurist and legal theorist
William Blackstone wrote that it was
considered a “universal maxim of the
common law of England, that no man is to be
brought into jeopardy of his life, more than
once, for the same offence.” And in
congressional debates before the enactment
of the Fifth Amendment, Rep. Roger
Sherman observed that “the courts of justice
would never think of trying and punishing
twice for the same offence.” Second, the
practical magnitude of the dual-sovereignty
exception is much greater today than it was
60 years ago. For most of our nation’s
history, the federal government left most
criminal matters to be handled by the states;
there were relatively few offenses punishable
by both authorities. But in recent decades,
there has been “a stunning expansion of
federal criminal jurisdiction into a field
traditionally policed by state and local laws,”
as Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in dissent
in Evans v. United States (1992). Now that
nearly every state crime has a federal analog,

At both the trial and appellate level, Gamble
argued that the federal prosecution violated
his Fifth Amendment right against being
placed twice in jeopardy for the same crime.
But given the “dual sovereignty” exception to
that Double Jeopardy Clause, which the
Supreme Court created 60 years ago—the
idea that federal and state prosecutions have
to be counted separately—the courts had to
ignore that objection. Cato has joined the
Constitutional Accountability Center in filing
a brief urging the Court to review Gamble’s
case and overturn this misguided exception—
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the dual-sovereignty exception risks entirely
swallowing the Double Jeopardy rule.
Finally, the Supreme Court created the dualsovereignty exception a decade before it held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause fully applies
to the states. Now that we know that it does,
there’s no reason why a state prosecution
shouldn’t “count” when a defendant objects
to having been prosecuted twice.

As Justice Hugo Black once put it, also in
dissent, “If double punishment is what is
feared, it hurts no less for two ‘Sovereigns’ to
inflict it than for one.” Bartkus v.
Illinois (1959). The Court should take this
common-sense advice and put an end to the
misguided dual-sovereignty exception, at
least as it works in practice in modern times.
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“Supreme Court to Hear Double Jeopardy Case with Implications for Mueller”
Side Bars Blog
Randall Eliason

July 11, 2018
Blockbuster decisions about the president’s
travel
ban and public
sector
unionsdominated the news during the final
week of the Supreme Court’s term. Less
noticed was the Court’s surprising
announcement that next term it will hear an
important double jeopardy case, Gamble v.
United States. The
Court’s
decision
in Gamble could have implications for the
Mueller investigation and the president’s
ability to undermine it by pardoning
witnesses against him. How the Court —
which by then may include a new Justice
Kavanaugh — resolves the case also could
provide new clues about its willingness to
overturn firmly-established constitutional
precedents.

pending, federal prosecutors charged him
with the federal version of the same offense,
based on the same incident. Gamble pleaded
guilty to the federal charge but preserved his
right to appeal and argue that this second
conviction violated the double jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment. The federal
case resulted in Gamble being sentenced to
an additional three years in prison.
Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty
The protection against double jeopardy is one
of the English common law doctrines that the
framers of our Constitution included in the
Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment
provides: “No person shall . . . be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb.” The government is not
allowed to prosecute you repeatedly for the
same conduct until it gets the result that it
wants. Once jeopardy attaches – typically
when you plead guilty or a jury is sworn in –
the government generally gets one shot at the
prosecution.

The petitioner, Terance Gamble, was
convicted of robbery in Alabama in 2008.
That felony conviction made it illegal for him
to possess a firearm under both Alabama and
federal law. In November 2015 police in
Mobile pulled Gamble over for a broken
taillight and smelled marijuana. When they
searched his car they found marijuana, a
scale, and a 9 mm handgun.

But the clause is subject to a “dual
sovereignty exception.” For more than 150
years the Supreme Court has said it does not
violate double jeopardy for a state and the
federal government to prosecute a defendant
for crimes based on the same act and

Alabama prosecuted Gamble for the state
crime of being a felon in possession of a
firearm. He was convicted and served a oneyear sentence. While the state case was
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consisting of the same elements. The
rationale is that within our federalist system
the federal and state governments are two
different sovereigns, each with the right to
enforce its own laws. State and federal crimes
based on the same conduct thus have not been
considered to be the same “offence” for
purposes of double jeopardy.

supposed to promote finality. It protects an
individual from repeated exposure to the
stress, humiliation, and expense that
accompany a prosecution. These injuries
from a repeated prosecution, Gamble urged,
are the same whether those prosecutions are
from the same sovereign or two different
ones.

Gamble’s Arguments

Finally, Gamble argued the exception needs
to be overturned due to the dramatic growth
of federal criminal law. When the exception
was first adopted the federal criminal code
was much less extensive. It would have been
relatively rare for the same conduct to be
prosecutable by both federal and state
authorities. But with the dramatic expansion
of the federal criminal code in the past few
decades, in the hands of a creative prosecutor
most state crimes may now be prosecuted
federally as well. As a result, the risk of the
harm resulting from a dual prosecution are far
greater. These changed circumstances,
Gamble argued, require a new legal standard.

In urging the Court to take his case, Gamble
argued the dual sovereignty exception is
inconsistent with the history and purpose of
the Fifth Amendment and should be
discarded. He first relied on history and
original intent, claiming the exception did not
exist at common law and that a conviction or
acquittal in another country was commonly
understood to bar a prosecution in England
based on the same misconduct.
Gamble also noted that the Supreme Court
first adopted the dual sovereignty exception
back when the Fifth Amendment was
considered not to apply to the states. That’s
no longer the case – the double jeopardy
clause is now one of the protections in the
Bill of Rights that the Court has incorporated
to
the
states
through
the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gamble argued this
makes the older holdings suspect and ripe for
reexamination. Now that double jeopardy
clearly applies to the states as well, he argued,
it’s improper to allow the state and federal
government to do together what each could
not do on its own.

The Government’s Response
In urging the Court not to take the case, the
government argued there is no reason to
reconsider a doctrine that has been firmly
established for more than 150 years. It
claimed the dual sovereignty exception is
part of the unique American system, where
the federal and state governments each
preserve their own sovereign spheres of
influence. It argued that English common law
precedents involving prosecutions in other
countries have no relevance to our federal
system, where both federal and state
governments have territorial jurisdiction over

Gamble also claimed the dual sovereignty
exception undermines the purpose of the
double jeopardy clause. The clause is
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crimes occurring within their respective
borders.

As for the expansion of federal criminal law,
the government argued this makes the
exception more important, not less. That
expansion means there are more potential
opportunities for federal law enforcement
potentially to encroach on the states.
Federalism demands that the states be
allowed to preserve their own sphere of
influence and law enforcement priorities
when it comes to crimes committed within
their borders.

The application of the double jeopardy clause
to the states is irrelevant, according to the
government. Even before application to the
states, if Gamble were correct the clause still
would have prevented federal prosecution for
a crime already prosecuted by a state – but the
Supreme Court has rejected that argument for
more than 150 years. Application of double
jeopardy to the states, the government said,
simply means a state cannot itself prosecute
someone twice for the same crime. It has no
effect on whether the state and federal
governments may proceed separately to
prosecute the same misconduct.

The bottom line argument for the government
was that there is no good reason to disturb
such a well-settled constitutional doctrine.
Dual prosecutions are relatively rare, and
judges always have the ability to take such
factors into account when fashioning an
appropriate sentence.

The government also argued that abandoning
the exception could lead to state and federal
governments interfering with each other’s
law enforcement efforts. A state prosecutor
could thwart federal law enforcement
priorities by bringing a case for the same
conduct and thereby foreclosing a federal
prosecution — and vice-versa. This could
lead to a “race to the courthouse” with federal
and state prosecutors competing to get their
charges filed first. Such a system would be
inconsistent with the respect that state and
federal governments owe each other under
our federal system.
(In his reply brief, Gamble has a nice
response to this point: “The purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, like the purpose of
the Free Speech Clause or Free Exercise
Clause, is not to protect the State and federal
governments from each other but, rather, to
secure the rights of the individual by
circumscribing the powers of both.”)

Why Did the Court Take the Case?
Gamble presents a fascinating mix of issues
and implications. It’s not at all clear why the
Court took the case. There was no split in the
lower courts or other compelling reason to reexamine such a settled doctrine. That the
Court agreed to hear the case anyway is
probably a sign it’s inclined to rule in
Gamble’s favor. On the other hand, the Court
re-scheduled consideration of the case in
conference a remarkable eleven times before
finally deciding to grant the petition on the
final day of the term. That suggests at least
some members of the Court were really
wrestling with the decision.
The Court’s action is even more surprising
considering it just reaffirmed the dual
sovereignty doctrine two years ago in a case
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called Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle. In an
opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court held that
Puerto Rico and the United States are not
separate sovereigns for purposes of double
jeopardy and thus the defendant could not be
prosecuted by both. But the majority opinion
did not question the validity of the dual
sovereignty exception and took it as settled
law.

Potential Implications of Gamble
Gamble has potential implications for
prosecutions that could be brought by special
counsel Robert Mueller. An issue looming
over the Mueller investigation has been
whether president Trump might pardon
members of his own family or potential
witnesses against him — or even himself.
One safeguard against that has been the
availability of state prosecutions. The
president cannot grant pardons for state
crimes. That leaves open the possibility that
even if Trump pardoned people such as Paul
Manafort, New York state prosecutors might
be able to pursue financial crimes that
violated New York law. Reports that Mueller
has been cooperating with the New York
Attorney General’s office have noted that
state prosecutions could be used as leverage
to induce cooperation in Mueller’s inquiry
even if Trump pardoned witnesses for federal
crimes.

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Thomas,
wrote
a
concurrence
in Sanchez
Valle criticizing the dual sovereignty
exception and suggesting it should be
revisited in an appropriate case. Gamble
relied heavily on that concurrence when
urging the Court to grant his petition.
Since Sanchez Valle was decided Justice
Gorsuch also has joined the Court, and
perhaps he was a third vote to take the case.
But
it
takes
four
Justices
to
grant certiorari and it’s not clear where the
fourth vote came from – or whether there will
be five votes to actually overturn the dual
sovereignty exception.

If the dual sovereignty exception is
discarded, however, this safety net could be
trimmed. For example, if Paul Manafort were
convicted of financial crimes by federal
prosecutors and then Trump pardoned him,
New York state prosecutors may no longer be
able to prosecute Manafort for the state
crimes covering the same misconduct.

Arguments about the understanding of the
clause in common law England may appeal
to originalists like Justice Gorsuch. But
conservative Justices also may be concerned
about federalism and whether a federal
prosecution can effectively trump a state’s
own law enforcement efforts. On the other
hand, arguments about the purpose of the
clause and protecting defendants from
repeated harassment may resonate with
Justices on the Court’s more liberal wing, as
suggested by Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence
in Sanchez Valle. The case could lead to
some very interesting voting alignments.

This highlights an interesting side effect of
abandoning the dual sovereignty doctrine: it
would mean the president could, in some
cases, effectively grant pardons for state
crimes by pardoning a federal defendant who
had already been placed in jeopardy for the
federal version of those same crimes. This
would represent a dramatic expansion of the
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pardon power and of presidential ability to
interfere with state law enforcement.

Some states, including New York, already
provide a broader double jeopardy protection
by statute. Professor Jed Shugerman has
noted this could have implications for New
York state prosecutions of people like Paul
Manafort and Michael Cohen if they are
prosecuted by Mueller and then pardoned by
President Trump. That remains true whether
or not Gamble overturns the dual sovereignty
exception – unless New York amends its law,
as Shugerman has urged. Professor
Shugerman has also suggested Mueller may
be strategically refraining from filing certain
charges, effectively reserving those charges
for the state prosecutors in the event Trump
grants a pardon. That sort of tactic could
become even more important based on the
Court’s decision in Gamble.

Another interesting aspect of Gamble that
will deserve attention is the role of stare
decisis. The upcoming confirmation hearings
for Trump’s Supreme Court nominee Brett
Kavanaugh will undoubtedly focus on the
doctrine of stare decisis and how it applies to
landmark cases such as Roe v. Wade.
The same week that it agreed to
hear Gamble, the Court overruled a forty-one
year precedent involving public unions when
it decided the Janus case. Gamble is asking
the Supreme Court to overrule constitutional
holdings that have been on the books for
decades. Gamble will present the Court with
another opportunity to discuss stare
decisis and when it is appropriate to overturn
settled Supreme Court precedents. That
discussion will be closely watched,
particularly if a new Justice Kavanaugh is on
the Court.

But of course the Mueller investigation is not
the norm. The unprecedented issues and
concerns
surrounding
the
Mueller
investigation do not affect routine law
enforcement. Most prosecutors, most of the
time, do not have to worry about the president
potentially obstructing their investigations by
granting
pardons. Gamble thus
looms
potentially larger in the Mueller investigation
that it does for law enforcement generally.

Practically speaking, even if the dual
sovereignty doctrine is overturned the effect
may be relatively limited. In many situations
state and federal crimes do not entirely
overlap and both state and federal
prosecutions for the same general conduct
will still be possible. And my experience is
that cases involving dual prosecutions are
pretty rare. Prosecutors are busy; if justice is
being pursued by their counterparts they are
usually happy to turn their attention to other
cases and not duplicate those efforts.

Gamble should be argued late this year or
early in 2019. The Court’s decision to
hear Gamble seems like a sign that the dual
sovereignty exception’s days may be
numbered. But the decision, and how the
Court reaches it, could end up having
implications that extend far beyond the facts
of Gamble’s own case.
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Garza v. Idaho
Ruling Below: Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017)
Overview: Gilberto Garza Jr. entered into two plea agreements waiving his right to appeal for
aggravated assault and possession of a controlled substance. When sentenced, the Court
acknowledged Garza’s appeal waiver, but simultaneously informed him of his right to appeal and
his right to a lawyer if he did decide to appeal. Garza claims that his trial counsel was
constitutionally inadequate because the lawyer would not file an appeal, even after Garza
repeatedly requested for one.
Issue: Whether the “presumption of prejudice” recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega applies when
a criminal defendant instructs his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal but trial counsel decides
not to do so because the defendant’s plea agreement included an appeal waiver.
Gilberto GARZA Jr., Petitioner- Appellant
v.
State of IDAHO, Respondent
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
Decided on November 6, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
appeal. The district court dismissed Garza’s
petitions concluding Garza’s counsel was not
ineffective in failing to appeal. The Court of
Appeals agreed and affirmed. We granted
Garza’s timely petition for review and affirm.

BURDICK, Circuit Judge:
Gilberto Garza, Jr., appeals the Ada
County district court’s order dismissing his
petitions for post-conviction relief. Garza
signed two plea agreements relating to
charges of aggravated assault and possession
of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute. As part of his plea agreements
Garza waived his right to appeal. Despite the
waivers, Garza instructed his attorney to
appeal. Garza’s attorney declined to file the
appeals, citing the waivers of appeal in the
plea agreements. Garza then filed two
petitions for post-conviction relief, alleging
his counsel was ineffective for failing to

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
This appeal involves two underlying
convictions and two corresponding petitions
for post-conviction relief. On January 23,
2015, Garza entered an Alford plea to
aggravated assault (assault case), and on
February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to
possession of a controlled substance with
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intent to deliver (possession case). The plea
agreements bound the district court to
sentence Garza to five years in prison for the
assault case (two years fixed, three
indeterminate), and another five years in
prison for the possession case (one year
fixed, four indeterminate). The sentences
were to run consecutively, along with another
prison sentence previously imposed on
Garza. The district court accepted the plea
agreements and imposed sentence in
accordance with them on the same day Garza
entered the possession plea. In both binding
Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(1)(c) plea
agreements, Garza waived his right to appeal,
and waived his right to request relief pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. The court
acknowledged that Garza had waived his
right to appeal but advised Garza of his
appeal rights anyway. Garza did not appeal
the convictions or sentences in the underlying
cases.

The court appointed an attorney for
Garza and issued a notice of intent to dismiss
all of Garza’s claims except for his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. After both
parties responded to the notice, the court
dismissed all post-conviction claims except
for the ineffective assistance of counsel claim
regarding the failure to file an appeal. The
parties then filed crossmotions for summary
adjudication on Garza’s remaining claim for
post-conviction relief, where Garza sought a
reopening of the appeals period in the
underlying criminal cases on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The district
court dismissed Garza’s petitions, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted
Garza’s timely petition for review
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL
1. Was Garza’s attorney ineffective
when he did not file an appeal after Garza
requested it even though Garza had waived
his right to appeal as part of a Rule 11 plea
agreement?

Approximately four months later,
Garza filed a petition for post-conviction
relief in each case, asserting among other
things that his trial attorney was ineffective
for not filing notices of appeal. Garza stated
in his affidavit submitted in the possession
case that he asked his attorney to appeal, and
in his affidavit submitted in his assault case
that his attorney failed to appeal despite
numerous phone calls and letters from Garza.
Garza’s former attorney stated in an affidavit
that he did not file an appeal because Garza
“received the sentence(s) he bargained for in
his [plea] agreement” and “an appeal was
problematic because [Garza] waived his right
to appeal in his Rule 11 agreements.”

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When addressing a petition for
review, this Court will give “serious
consideration to the views of the Court of
Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of
the lower court.” State v. Schall, 157 Idaho
488, 491, 337 P.3d 647, 650 (2014) (quoting
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d
387, 389 (2007)). “Proceedings for postconviction relief are civil in nature, rather
than criminal, and therefore the applicant
must prove the allegations in the request for
relief by a preponderance of the evidence.”
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State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313
P.3d 1, 17 (2013). The district court may
grant a motion by either party for summary
disposition for post-conviction relief when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. I.C. § 19-4906(c). This Court
exercises free review over the district court’s
“determination as to whether constitutional
requirements have been satisfied in light of
the facts found.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 361,
313 P.3d at 17 (quoting State v. Pearce, 146
Idaho 241, 248, 192 P.3d 1065, 1072 (2008)).

and that Garza was prejudiced when his
attorney declined to file an appeal in light of
the waiver. For the reasons discussed below,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Garza’s petitions for post-conviction relief.
Criminal defendants have a Sixth
Amendment right to “reasonably effective”
legal assistance. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. 470, 476 (2000) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); see
also Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262
P.3d 255, 260 (2011). A defendant claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel must show
that (1) counsel’s representation was
deficient; and (2) counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–92; Self v. State,
145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct.
App. 2007). To show counsel was deficient,
the defendant has the burden of showing that
his attorney’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon
v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174,
1176 (1988). Generally, when trial counsel
fails to file an appeal at a criminal
defendant’s request, such performance is
professionally unreasonable and therefore
deficient. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477;
Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 362, 883
P.2d 714, 720 (Ct. App. 1994). To show that
counsel’s deficient performance was
prejudicial, the defendant must show there is
a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s deficiencies, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669; Aragon, 114
Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. This test
applies to claims that counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a notice of appeal. Flores-

IV. ANALYSIS
A criminal defendant is permitted to
waive his right to appeal as part of a plea
agreement. State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456,
457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994). The waiver is
valid and will be upheld as long as it was
entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently as part of a plea agreement. Id.
In this case, the district court found that
Garza did not show that his plea was not
knowing, voluntary, or intelligent, nor did
Garza raise this issue on appeal. The sole
issue remaining is whether, despite the appeal
waiver, Garza still had the right to appeal and
therefore his counsel was ineffective for
failing to file an appeal at his request.
This Court has not yet decided
whether counsel is ineffective if counsel
denies his client’s request to file an appeal
when the client waived the right to appeal in
a binding Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea
agreement. Garza argues that the district
court erred in requiring him to show, rather
than presuming, his counsel was deficient
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Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477. However, whether
counsel was ineffective becomes unclear
when the reason the attorney did not file the
appeal is because the client waived the right
to appeal as part of a plea agreement.

492 F.3d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir.
2007); Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d
960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); Campusano v.
United States, 442 F.3d 770, 775 (2d Cir.
2006); United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409
F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th
Cir. 2005); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433
F.3d 788, 794 (11th Cir. 2005). Under the
majority approach, an attorney is required to
file an appeal at his client’s request, even if
the attorney thinks the appeal would be
frivolous. Campusano, 442 F.3d at 771–72.
When counsel fails to follow his client’s
express direction to appeal, prejudice is
presumed. Id. at 772. “The prejudice in
failure to file a notice of appeal cases is that
the defendant lost his chance to file the
appeal, not that he lost a favorable result that
he would have obtained by appeal.”
Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1197.

Neither the United States Supreme
Court nor this Court have decided whether an
attorney has provided ineffective assistance
of counsel if the attorney declines to file an
appeal after a defendant has requested it,
when the defendant has waived the right to
appeal as part of a plea agreement. There is a
federal circuit split regarding the issue, which
involves differing interpretations of the
United State Supreme Court’s decision in
Flores-Ortega. The Flores-Ortega case did
not involve an appeal waiver, but rather dealt
with whether an attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel when she failed to
appeal because it was unclear if her client
wanted to appeal. See Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. at 475. The Court held “when counsel’s
constitutionally
deficient
performance
deprives a defendant of an appeal that he
otherwise would have taken, the defendant
has made out a successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claim entitling him to
an appeal.” Id. at 484.

Two federal circuit courts and a
federal district court in an undecided circuit
follow the minority approach and hold that
Flores-Ortega does not require an attorney
be presumed ineffective for failing to appeal
upon request when there has been a waiver of
the right to appeal. See Nunez v. United
States, 546 F.3d 450, 456 (7th Cir. 2008),
vacated on other grounds by Nunez v. United
States, 554 U.S. 911 (2008); United States v.
Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 2008);
Maes v. United States, No. 15-CV-240-SM,
2015 WL 9216583, at *3 (D.N.H. Dec. 16,
2015). The minority approach does not
presume deficiency or prejudice when an
attorney denies his client’s instruction to file
an appeal when there has been an appeal

A majority of federal circuit courts
have interpreted Flores-Ortega to apply even
in situations where the defendant has validly
waived his right to appeal. Those circuits
hold that attorneys are ineffective when they
do not file an appeal after the clients
requested it, regardless of whether the
defendants had waived their rights. See
Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 360
(6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Poindexter,
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waiver, and instead requires the defendant
meet the test in Strickland, which requires
showing
deficient
performance
and
prejudice. Nunez, 546 F.3d at 456. The
minority approach holds that when a
defendant waives his appellate rights, he no
longer has a right to appeal, and therefore an
attorney is not bound to file an appeal at his
client’s request. Id. at 455.

right to appeal has been signed by the
defendant”).
In a recent case, this Court discussed
Flores-Ortega in the context of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim when counsel did
not consult with a defendant about filing an
appeal after the defendant waived his right to
appeal. McKinney v. State, 162 Idaho 286,
__, 396 P.3d 1168, 1171–72 (2017). In
McKinney, a defendant waived his right to
appeal as part of a Rule 11 sentencing
agreement, and then sought post-conviction
relief on the ground that his attorney was
ineffective for not consulting with him about
appealing his sentence, despite having
waived his appeal rights in the plea. Id. at __,
396 P.3d at 1179. This Court interpreted
Flores-Ortega to not compel a bright-line
presumption of deficiency or prejudice in the
failure to consult context. Id. Rather, this
Court considered whether counsel’s failure to
consult with the defendant about filing an
appeal was deficient conduct that prejudiced
the defendant, and concluded it was not. Id.

Though few other states have
addressed the issue, the ones who have
continue to apply the Strickland test. See
Buettner v. State, 2015 MT 348N, ¶¶ 14–15
(Mont. 2015) (applying the two-prong test of
Strickland to determine that counsel was not
ineffective in failing to file a notice of
appeal); People v. Miller, 784 N.Y.S.2d 680,
681–82 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (“Where, as
here, a defendant makes an informed and
intelligent waiver of the right to appeal,
ordinarily he or she will be precluded from
arguing ineffective assistance of counsel,
except to the extent that the claimed
ineffective assistance impacts upon the
voluntariness of the plea.”); Stewart v. United
States, 37 A.3d 870, 877 (D.C. Ct. App.
2012) (holding Flores-Ortega did not control
when there had been an appeal waiver, and
stating that “[defendant’s] claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to
the failure to file a notice of appeal is
palpably incredible . . . .”); Kargus v. State,
169 P.3d 307, 320 (Kan. 2007) (citing Kan.
Admin. Regs. § 105-3-9) (applying a
modified adaptation of Flores-Ortega,
however, it is limited by statutory language
stating an attorney must “file notice of appeal
in a timely manner, unless a waiver of the

In this case, we decline to presume
counsel ineffective for failing to appeal at
Garza’s request when Garza has waived the
right to appeal as part of a plea agreement.
Rather, to show ineffective assistance of
counsel, Garza must show deficient conduct
and resulting prejudice. In so holding, we
conclude that Flores-Ortega does not require
counsel be presumed ineffective for failing to
appeal at the client’s direction in situations
where there has been a waiver of the right to
appeal, as there was here.
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show both that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced
the applicant. Where the alleged deficiency is
counsel’s failure to file a . . . motion, a
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would
not have been granted, is generally
determinative of both prongs of the test. If the
motion lacked merit and would have been
denied, counsel ordinarily would not be
deficient for failing to pursue it, and,
concomitantly, the petitioner could not have
been prejudiced by the want of its pursuit. Id.
(quoting Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158–
59, 857 P.2d 634, 637–38 (Ct. App. 1993)).
As the district court correctly stated, “[i]t
would seem anomalous to presume prejudice
in the failure-to-appeal context when the
defendant waived the right to appeal, yet not
presume prejudice in the Rule 35 context
even when the defendant has not waived the
right to file a Rule 35 motion.” Other Idaho
cases have adopted similar policies regarding
when counsel is ineffective:

The Flores-Ortega Court made clear
that a presumption of prejudice applies in the
context of an ineffectiveness claim because
an attorney’s deficient performance deprives
the defendant of his or her opportunity for an
appellate proceeding. Notably, FloresOrtega did not address whether this principle
has any force, let alone controls, where the
defendant has waived his right to appellate
and collateral review. Mabry, 536 F.3d at 240
(citations omitted). In fact, the Court in
Flores-Ortega stated, “The even more
serious denial of the entire judicial
proceeding itself, which a defendant wanted
at the time and to which he had a right,
similarly demands a presumption of
prejudice.” 528 U.S. at 483 (emphasis
added). Once a defendant has waived his
right to appeal in a valid plea agreement, he
no longer has a right to such an appeal. Thus,
the presumption of prejudice articulated in
Flores-Ortega would not apply after a
defendant has waived his appellate rights.
Therefore, an attorney who declines to file
the appeal when there has been a waiver will
not be presumed ineffective, nor will the
attorney be found to have violated the Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct.

When considering whether an
attorney’s failure to file or pursue a motion to
suppress or strike evidence constitutes
incompetent performance, the court is
required to examine the probability of
success of such a motion in order to
determine whether counsel’s decision against
pressing the motion was within the wide
range of permissible discretion and sound
trial strategy. In Carter v. State, 108 Idaho
788, 794-795, 702 P.2d 826, 832-33 (1985),
the Idaho Supreme Court held that counsel’s
failure to move to suppress the defendant’s
confession constituted ineffective assistance
because it was obvious that the confession
would have been suppressed. In Maxfield v.

This approach is consistent with other
areas of Idaho law. Idaho courts do not
presume a defendant is prejudiced when an
attorney fails to follow his client’s instruction
to file a Rule 35 motion, despite the client
having the right to do so. Hassett v. State, 127
Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App.
1995).
[T]o prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel an applicant . . . must
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State, 108 Idaho 493, 501, 700 P.2d 115, 123
(Ct. App. 1985), we held that newly
appointed counsel’s failure to renew a motion
to suppress was not deficient, since previous
counsel had been unsuccessful on the same
motion and no new grounds existed. Because
it was clear that the new motion would have
been denied as well, counsel’s failure to make
the motion was not deficient. See also, Davis
v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243,
1248 (Ct. App. 1989), (counsel’s failure to
timely file a motion to suppress evidence
seized from defendant’s home was not
deficient because defendant had failed to
show that the items would have been
suppressed); State v. Youngblood, 117 Idaho
160, 165, 786 P.2d 551, 556 (1990) (failure
to move to suppress items seized was not
error where items were obviously subject to
plain view exception to exclusionary rule);
State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 56, 813 P.2d
857, 867 (1991) (failure of counsel to object
to inadmissible opinion testimony was
ineffective assistance.) Huck, 124 Idaho at
158, 857 P.2d at 637. While the above cases
do not deal with appeal waivers specifically,
they show the policy of this Court to not
presume counsel ineffective automatically
when counsel exercises judgment in
declining to file a motion where it would
obviously be denied, or where the motion had
previously been unsuccessful. See Davis, 116
Idaho at 406, 775 P.2d at 1248.

Professional Conduct 3.1. The defendant,
even if allowed his appeal, will very likely
still have his appeal dismissed as a result of
the waiver, and “[t]here is no point in a
constitutional rule that would yield an
exercise in futility.” Nunez, 546 F.3d at 456.
Garza’s attorney chose to exercise
professional judgment and uphold the plea
agreements that contained his client’s
original desire to waive his right to appeal.
Such an exercise of judgment that keeps
frivolous and futile litigation out of the courts
will not be presumed ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Additionally, a plea agreement is a
bilateral contract, to which both the State and
defendant are bound. McKinney, 162 Idaho at
__, 396 P.3d at 1178. Once a defendant has
accepted the plea, he should be bound by the
waiver therein. Nunez, 546 F.3d at 455.
“Empty promises are worthless promises; if
defendants could retract their waivers . . .
then they could not obtain concessions by
promising not to appeal.” United States v.
Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995).
“[Garza] exchanged the right to appeal for
prosecutorial concessions; he cannot have his
cake and eat it too.” Id. Moreover, a lawyer
has a duty to avoid taking actions that will
cost their client the benefit of the plea
bargain. Nunez, 546 F.3d at 455. If an
attorney files an appeal despite a waiver in
the plea agreement, the agreement may be
breached, and the State may now be entitled
to disregard the plea in its entirety. Here,
filing an appeal would have been a direct
violation of the plea agreement, and the State
would have been free to revoke the benefits
of the plea given to Garza. When Garza’s

Moreover, a criminal defense
attorney has a duty to the judicial system to
exercise professional judgment and not file
frivolous litigation, “and an appeal in the
teeth of a valid waiver is frivolous.” Nunez,
546 F.3d at 455; See also Idaho Rules of
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attorney declined to file an appeal because
the right to appeal had been waived, counsel
ensured Garza would not be in breach of the
plea. We are cognizant that there are
conceivable situations where a defendant
who has waived his right to appeal as part of
a plea agreement may still seek to challenge
his conviction or sentence, for example if he
is sentenced illegally or the State breaches the
plea agreement. This is properly done in a
petition for post-conviction relief or writ of
habeas corpus, rather than on direct appeal.

therefore could not show prejudice.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Garza’s petitions for postconviction relief
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Garza’s petitions for postconviction relief. This Court does not
presume counsel to be automatically
ineffective when counsel declines to file an
appeal in light of an appeal waiver. Rather, a
defendant needs to show deficient
performance and resulting prejudice to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because
Garza cannot show such grounds, his
petitions for post-conviction relief were
properly dismissed by the district court, and
the district court is affirmed.

In this case, we decline to presume
Garza’s counsel ineffective when counsel
failed to file an appeal at Garza’s request
because of the appeal waiver. Rather, to show
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
appeal in light of the waiver, Garza needed to
show both deficient performance and
resulting prejudice. The district court
concluded that Garza was unable to show any
non-frivolous grounds for appeal, and

Justices JONES, HORTON, BRODY and
TROUT, Pro Tem, CONCUR.
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“Clients, Lawyers, and Appeals”
Crime and Consequences Blog
Kent Scheidegger

June 18, 2018
The U.S. Supreme Court today took
up Garza v. Idaho, No. 17-1026, involving
the intersection of two recurring themes:
lawyer decisions v. client decisions in the
conduct of a case and how to apply rules
developed for trials to the context of pleabargained cases, which most cases are now.
In the course of a criminal trial, the lawyer
makes most of the decisions, but a few are
reserved for the client personally. Whether
to
appeal
is
a
client
decision. In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.
470 (2000), the Court dealt with the issue of
ineffective assistance claims for a lawyer's
failure to appeal, with or without consulting
the client. If the lawyer is found to have
performed deficiently, the "prejudice"
question is only whether there is a reasonable
probability the client would have appealed,
not that he would have prevailed on appeal.

sentencing recommendations. Pet. App. 28a29a. Garza also waived his right to appeal and
his right to seek a reduction of his sentences
under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. Pet. App. 2a3a. The district court imposed the agreedupon sentences. Pet. App. 29a. Garza
requested his trial counsel to file a notice of
appeal but, in light of the waiver, his counsel
declined. Pet. App. 29a.
It seems to me that the situation here is quite
different from Flores-Ortega. In that case,
the lawyer's allegedly ineffective failure to
file an appeal denied the client an entire
judicial proceeding that he was entitled
to. The Court relied heavily on the
distinction between a claim that a proceeding
was conducted unfairly and a claim that a
proceeding did not happen at all. In this case,
the proceeding was one that the client
voluntarily gave up in return for a reduced
sentence. The proceeding not happening at
all was precisely what he agreed to, and a
finding that he had no right to it is quite
different from a finding that he would not
have prevailed in it.

The wrinkle in the Garza case is that the
defendant pleaded guilty and waived his right
to appeal as part of the bargain. From the
Brief in Opposition:
Garza pleaded guilty to aggravated assault
and possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver pursuant to plea agreements
with the State of Idaho. Pet. App. 2a. As part
of those plea agreements the district court
bound itself to follow certain "bargained for"

“Justice to Resolve Circuit Split Over Appeal Waivers”
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Courthouse News Service
Dan McCue

June 18, 2018
Garza’s attorney acknowledged he declined
to file an appeal on his client’s behalf, but
said he explained that the waiver the inmate
had agreed to made an appeal problematic.

The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to resolve a split amount the circuit courts on
the question of when an inmate has a right to
file an appeal of his conviction despite the
fact his plea agreement specifically waives
that right.

For its part, the government said if Garza still
wanted to press his case, he was required to
show actual prejudice from the loss of a
chance to appeal his case.

The case comes to the court from Idaho,
where in early 2015 petitioner Gilberto Garza
Jr. entered an Alford plea to aggravated
assault and a guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance. (An Alford plea is a
guilty plea in which the defendant maintains
his innocence of a crime, but nevertheless
concedes prosecutors have enough evidence
to prove he is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.)

Every federal circuit has weighed in on the
issue presented in the case. In doing so, eight
circuits have adopted the “presumption of
prejudice” set forth by the Supreme Court in
the 2000 case Roe v. Flores-Ortega, but two
circuits have deferred, requiring a showing of
actual prejudice.
The district court adopted the view of the
minority of circuits and denied Garza’s
appeal, although it noted there is a split
among the circuits that the Supreme Court
had not resolved. The Idaho Court of Appeals
and state Supreme Court later affirmed the
ruling.

Both plea agreements included a provision
specifying that Garza waited his right to
appeal.
At a joint sentencing hearing, the district
court accepted both plea agreements,
acknowledged the appeal waiver, but went on
to advise Garza of his right to appeal and his
right to be appointed counsel if he did so.

In a petition for a writ of certiorari filed on
Garza’s behalf, Amir Ali of the Roderick &
Solance and the MaCarthur Justice Center in
Washington, D.C., says these decisions were
“wrong and troubling.”
“While a plea waiver may substantially limit
the scope of issues available to a defendant if
he chooses to appeal, even the broadest

Later, Garza filed a pro se petition for
postconviction relief, asserting he repeatedly
instructed his trial counsel to file a notice of
appeal on his behalf, but that the lawyer
failed to do so. He said this failure was proof
he received ineffective counsel in his case.
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waiver leaves open a number of significant
issues, including those going to voluntariness
or competence to enter the plea, ineffective
assistance of counsel during the plea process,
and the legality of the sentence imposed,” Ali
write. “Where trial counsel refuses a criminal
defendant’s instruction to file a notice of

appeal, counsel thus deprives the defendant
of a counseled direct appeal on these issues
“altogether.”
As is their custom, the justices did not explain
their rational for taking up the case on
Monday.
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The case is Markle Interests LLC et al. v.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service et al., case
number 14-31008, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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